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New wave of arrests 
in ,East 11mor 
Sinqe April this :vear, many people have'been arrested 
in Dili,' Baucau, Venilale, Man,a~.i.ito, Airiaro and, other 
places. The're are also .reports of dozens of ~eople 
being summarily executed in Baucau and elsewhere. 
, According to a clandestine documen~ ~ated 15 April 
1989, twenty people were shot dead between 12 - 15 
March by troops under the command of Colonel 
Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto. The 
killings took place in Bere-Coli, Bauca.u and all those 
put to . dea~}l were from , the locali,tr. , They ·were 
.accused of having contact with Falintil, ' the arined 
/ esisfunce, which is active in the vicinity of BauCa\.l. 
". The arrests in Baucau commenced on 5 May. Within ~ month forty person~ hacl been '.detained and were 
being held at a. new detention cehtre at Baucau 
airport. Those arrested were reportedly suspected of 
supporting Bishop Belo's plebiscite letter to ' the UN 
itnd/or of engaging in clandestine activities in sup-
port of· the resistance. 
So far, we have received several lists which include 
alfogether more than a hundred riames of people held 
since· midLAprU. According to one report, a hundred 
students were ·arrested in' Dili on 13 and 14 May 
though only :one riame is a~ailable. on 29 May; stu-
dents at the University of East Timar (Untim) wrote 
protesting a'ga.inst the 'Dili arre~ts, following' which 
seven more stuaents; whose n:ames 8.'re not available, 
were arrested; All the detainees are being held at 
army detention and il'.ltei·rogation 'centres, not in 
prisons to which the International Red Cross has 
acc·ess. 
One list of 25 names, which was 'cqmpiled by Bishop 
Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East ' Timor, says 
at the beginning: 'Colonel Bimo, chief of intelligeriqe' 
of Ko6pskatri (the special security command for 'East 
Timar) has confirmed that the following prisoners and 
detainees have been taken intO' ¢\1stody in the iriter-; 
ests' ·. of . the , Pope's security,' ·a. reference to the 
pla~ned visit of Pop John Pal.if in Oct?ber this year. 
,. . . 
Arrests in Bali and Jakarta . 
On 14 June, Elias Pereira Moniz> a Tiinorese stuoent 
at Udayana University, Bali was· arri:;sted, followihg 
the interrogation 6f peopfo arre¢fod in . Baucau and 
Dill. This • arrest prompted eight Timorese, most of 
them still studying at Uda,yana University1 to flee 
frorri ':Bali to Jakarta•to ~sC(:lpe arrest. In Jakarta, one 
of the students, Miguel Amaral Guterres; disappeared. 
Another, Lucas da Costa, a former Udayana student 
was arrested in Jakarta ort 16 June. Lucas da Costa is 
still under detention at an unknown location, while 
Miguel Guterres is still unaccounted for. 
ffu""8Jl Rights InsU~ut.e st.epa in . . 
The Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Ruman 
Rights has, for . the first time, pyblicly .expressed 
concern abm,1t the hiJman rights situatio.n. in East 
'j:'imor. In a letter to G~r;ieral 'fry Soetrisno, com~ 
mander-in-chief of the Jndonesian Armed Forces on 15 
June 1989, the In~titute said it had been informed 
that "at the beginning, in the middle. and. at . the .end 
pf May, . h~ndred$ of peqple had ,been a,rreste~ S.1?~ 
there ~ad , even b,een executfons of people without 
trial. They were detained on suspicion of suppqrting 
Bishop Belo's letter to . the United Nations • . These 
t1ctions are not only in conflict with basic h1,1man 
rights but Bl so jnfringe the provisions of ,the , Con-
stitution and the Criminal Procedures Code (KUH,l\P ). " 
I( these repor,ts . were true, .the letter continued, t 
General Try Spetrisno should investigate the activities 
of those responsible. ' . 
, Ple4$e turn , to page 18. 
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Massive military and security 
operations in East 1imor 
In a meeting in June with Jose Guterres, who is on the staff of the Information Office of 
Fretilln (GIF) in Lisbon, TAPOL was ' given a detailed account of the militlir.v operations' now 
under way in Ea.st Timor. 
Since November 1988, the number ot Indonesian 
troops in East Timor has increased to a.n estimated 3~ 
battalions (more than 25,000 troops) and military 
operations have continued without interruption, 
during the rainy as well as the dry seasons. The, 
current wave of operations commenced on 4 November, 
a few days after President Suhartq made a one-day 
visit to Dili. Troops that had come to Timar to handle 
security before and during the visit sta.yed on to 
tali;e part in the current operations. According to a 
Fretilin communique in May this year, these 32 
battallbns are supported by tanks, heavy artillery , 
helicopters, OV-10 Bronco fighter-planes and bombers 
while in the : coustal regions of Viqueque, Los. Palos 
and Zumalai; infantry troops are supported by naval 
vessels. 
The armed resistance, Falintil, has two types of 
units, concentrated forces (formerly known as shock 
brigades) and guerrilla detachments. The latter carry 
out reconnaissance duties and are riot armed, often 
wea:dng lndon:e~ian army uniforms or other disguises 
to rhingle ,with the population in Indonesian•occupied 
areas. The col')centrated for,ces ~re engaged in opera-
tions against Indonesian units, ta.king , care never t:o 
launch an operation without being sure of benefits 
such as capturing weapons or ammunition. 
In an interview with AMPO, the Japan-Asia Quarterly 
Review (Volume 20, No. 3), Guterres said that the 
CQJ'.lcentraf:E!d forces consist of two. compani~8-~ each 
Jose Guterl'es in Ja.p1in 
made up of four platoons consisting ot three section$. 
In the border area near West Timar, "we have 5 units 
of'concentrated tr~ps and besides this, we have our 
guerrilla detachn'ient s. , The size and position ot (our) 
forces in an area varies because they often follow the 
movements of: Indonesian troops. After all. the war in 
East Timar is a guerrilla war, not a conventional war. 
We have more forces in the eastern and central 
r(!gio~s and so fighting is heavier. there/' GQ.terr~s 
t.Old TAPOL that there are between 3,500 and 4,000 
arined guerrillas, bearing a variety of weapons, mostly 
boug'ht or captured from Indonesian troops. ' 
Wear1na dowh the · g\l~rrlllaa 
Indonesi!ln strategy' ha,s changed, from concentrating 
their troops iri certain areas and launching BWee.Ps 
against guerri}lti units, to a straf:E!gy known in count-;-
er-insurgency parlanqe as 'nomadizacB.o' or nomadiza-
tion, a strategy used by the colonial Portuguese army 
'in the former . Portuguese African colOµles. In In-
donesia, the st:i;'ategy js known as benten8 stel&el; or 
'fortress' strategy, ·'first employed by · the Dutch 
colonial army to subdtie the people of Aceh at the end 
of the 19th ,century. . . . 
In places where guerrillas . are known to .. exist, .. ~Ae 
army establishes a huge circle or for,~;r.ess ~f ar!Jly 
posts to seal off the area. Inside ·this fortress, · they 
establish, an lnper circle of ,bases consisting of 
combined lndon~sian troops 8,n<i East Timor~se para:; 
military units composed .· of ~atih (trained people), 
hansip (qivil defence) ,and wsnra (people's defence), 
known collectively as sakaor. 'security units'. Prima~ 
ily, the manpower is recruited, f,roD1 the local popula-
tion. The units inside are required to settle down in 
the , area of operations and may remai.n there for 
months at a stretch, living like guerrilla~. They are 
expected ' tO practise guerrilla tactics Against tpe 
resistance, with small ·groups being ,sent to hunt 
guerrillas; Indonesian soldiers inside the fortresses 
camouflage them.~~lves by for, instance not . using 'soa.p 
which creates a ,distinctive, body odour . and a~9iding 
o~her, identifiable signs and smells. They , consist of 
'nang~~a' (para-commandos) as well as iQfantry. 
'Total people•a defence• 
This strateg.y is a classic example Q,f. the Indonesian 
army's dClctrine of ha~k{lmrsts, . or tota.l people's 
defence which means mobilising the local population 
against the enemy. Its cha~ces of ~µ~cess are clearly 
limited in I;\ situp.tion where there is widespread local 
BYP}Pathy for the , r~s,istance. The, strategy is very 
costly financially, :and in manpower and , .jt~ use sug-
gestJ;J a desperate . bi.d in ,Jakarta to encl, J;esistance ·in 
East Timor, if possible in time for the Pope's visit in 
October. According io Bish9p · Belo~ ·· the · Indone,$i4n 
arm~d f,or,ces plan.tpJauncp. a 'grand, .tinal' caqtpaign 
in ,,July t}lisc .year to crush ,. th~ resistance fi.(l,d in 
particular to capt~re Xanaf?~· , · · 
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One of the most devastating consequences of the 
strategy is that men from the resettlements have been 
obliged to abandon their families for long periods, 
with disastrous effects on food cultivation. This 
explain:a.:why reports are now coming out of severe 
food shortages in some parts of East Timor. 
There are two main objectives, to ·capture guerrillas 
or' keep them constantly on the move by preventing 
guerrillas from settling anywhere, thus causing. ex-
haustion. When guerrillas are spotted, operations are 
launched; in some cases, the resistance has sustained 
losses but their ability to disperse and escape from 
encirclement is considerable. The operations require 
extensive use of military aircraft - helicopters to 
airlift reinforcements when assaults on· guerrilla 
positions are planned, and ground-attack aircraft to 
attack and bomb identified guerrilla bases. 
Falintil forces avoid open engagements with army 
units inside the circles, attacking army supply lines 
outside or supply bases farther off, which ·keep the 
troops inside the fortresses supplied with food and 
other requirements. This . is where the Indonei;ian 
army is suffering its heaviest casualties. In both Dili 
and Baucau, it is believed·, two or three soldiers are 
being buried every day. According to Fretilin sour-
ces, the Indonesians lost 37 troops in a single opera-
Kopa.ssus ti·oops 
tion last January in LaUne, near Lacluta. 
Although official visitors to Dill report no sign of 
military activity, Pat Walsh of ACFOA, Australia, 
visited DiU fo May and reported that on Sunday, the 
fir~~; day of his visit, DiH lo9ked ~alm .and peaceful 
witl{ not an lndonesian soldier m s1ght. · B.ut on 
Monday mornirig1 the i;>le:ce was transformed. Army 
helieopters werfi!. bringing in troop reinforcemen~s, a 
unit of soldiers was seen doing physical exercises, 
and ' six trucklQads of troops armed ,with automatic 
weapons were spotted speeding out, of the city, Walsh 
was tol<l bY a bystander that the trucks were off to 
Maubfsse "where some people are not happy .about 
things"'. 
Bo&ua clandestine organi~tiona . 
The Indonesian army is also engaged in counter-
insurgency operations in the cities, concentrating on 
trying to penetrate the clandestine organisations. 
Several discrete clandestine groups operate, in order 
to limit the damage ot e.ltposure ot any one group. 
EASTTIMOR 
----~-
Now army intelligence has started creating its own 'cla~destine' networks, to trap genuine nctivists. The 
recent arrests, especially in Dili and Baucau, may be 
the result of successful penetrations. 
Colonel Prabowo, President Suharto's son-in-law, is 
in charge ot operations against the clandestine 
network. As commander of Battalion 328, he has his hq 
in Comoro-Dili, with one company in Dill and one in 
Baucau. His Dili-based company is in Ts.ci-Tolu, the 
place which has been selected as the site for the Mass 
to be conducted by Pope John-Paul when he visits 
East Timor in October. [This choice is widely opposed 
in East Timor because of its long association with 
Indonesian atrocities.] 
This is Prabowo's second tour of duty in East Timor, 
the first being when he was a member of the unit 
which tracked .down and murdered Fretilin leAder, 
Nicolau Lobato, in December 1978. 
Prabowo arrived in East Timer last November and 
soon started renewing his former close relations with 
members of Apodeti, the party which favoured in-
tegration with Indonesia. This appears to be aimed 
partly at mitigating Apodeti frustrations at having 
lost out to former UDT members in the share of jobs 
in the local administration. Apodeti people have been 
recruited into his bogus clandestine networks. But 
battaiton 328 troops are also used in operations 
against guerrillas in the bush, when necessary. 
Prabowo*a apecle1 aSaslon 
It is becoming increasingly clear that Prabowo has 
been dispatched to East Timor on a special mission 
from Suharto to crush the resisUince and capture its 
leadership. Documents from the underground say that 
Prabowo and his troops will not depart · from East 
Timor until this mission has been fulfilled. The 
deadline is October, when the Pope is due to visit 
East Timor. It appears too that Indonesia wants to 
delay the visit of the Portuguese parliamenttn•y 
mission, originally scheduled tor July, until October 
or later. 
Until about a year ago, Prabowo was deputy com-
mander of the Slat Brigade, a special unit of combined 
forces including kopassus (para-commando) which is 
Prabowo's original unit. The Slat Brigade, Suharto1s 
personal bodyguard, stands outside th. e a. rmy struc-t 
ture and is said by some to be the only nrmy unit on 
which Suharto can fully rely, Prabowo has now left 
Colonel Prsbowo 
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Kopaseus to join Kujang, the strike-force ot the 
Sillwangi Division in the I!Ird Regional Military 
Command in West Java, The battalion he commands in 
East Tfmor is from Slliwangi. 
A tour of duty in East Timar is essential for a 
military career and will almost certainly ensure his 
promotion to brigadier-general. In Prabowo's case, 
serving in Timar may been even more necessary as he 
is not popular with senior army officers. One thing is 
certain: never before have the activities of a middle-
ranking officer serving in East Timar been high-
lighted as now, with hardly a mention of the Korem 
commander. 
If Prabowo succeeds in doing what the armed forces 
under General Murdani failed to achieve in nearly 
fourteen years, this would be a major scoop for the 
Suharto dynasty. 
ltoopakaa 
Koopskam, the special operational command tor secu-
rity in Ea.st Timor, has not yet been disbanded, 
Newly-an·ived refugees in Lisbon refer to Koospkam 
as being in the forefront of the arrest and inter-
rogation of suspects. They say the command is due to 
move to Ba.ucau and there are other reports that it 
may be disbanded in October.· Koopskam is also 
responsible for issuing permits for travel outside East 
Timor and granting permits to the International Red 
Cross and other agencies sending missions around the 
country. The new commander of Korem in East Timar 
is Lieutenant-Colonel Rudi Warof; , a Christian officer 
h~~~~ • 
Reactions to Bishop Belo's 
UN letter 
The letter Bishop Belo sent to the UN Secretary-
General, asking him to intervene in the decolonisation 
process in East Timor in a normal and democratic way 
through a referendum [see lea.cl story in TAPOL 
Bulletin ,No 93] was bound to trigger reactions in 
Indonesia. 
~oreign Minister Alatas remarked that the Bishop 
had turned the clock back while Minister of Defence 
General Murdani, the architect of the East Timar 
invasion, showed his irritation as a fellow Catholic: · "I 
am disappointed to know that one of the leaders ot my 
church has spoken out in this manner. He only 
became an Indonesian citizen a few years ago. Do not 
expect that religious leaders are automatically clever 
politicians; some are stupid (blo'on, Ind,) like him". 
(Suara Ksrys, 26 May 1989). 
The grey-haired Admiral Sudomo, Coordine.tlng Mini-
ster for Political and Security Affe.irs, thought it was 
possible that the Bishop had been "subject to political 
infiltration, if indeed he wrote a letter like that". 
(Wsspada, 18 May 1989). General Try Soetrisno, armed 
forces Commander"-in-Chief thought it necessary to 
warn the Bishop without specifying what he meant. 
He claimed that the question of East Timor "has 
already been solved!' and dismissed the Bishop's 
letter as the expression of a personal opinion which 
would be of no consequence. 
Belo's letter, in effect a denunciation of Indonesian 
colonialism, is tant{lmount to a cardinal sin. Consider-
ing the gravity of the act, the rema1·ks of Indonesian 
officials have been relatively mild. Combined with the 
remarks of people like Governor Carrascalao and the 
statement of the East Timorese DPRD (provincial 
assembly), it is apparent that the line being pursued 
is to isolate Bishop Belo. He is being portrayed like a 
voice in the wilderness. · 
Anti-Belo proteat turn.a lntio support r.:117 
In Dfli, there were moves soon after it became known 
that the Bishop had written to the UN, to organise a 
demonstration of protest. Former ,t\podeti supporters 
were recruited to denounce the Bishop in tront of hie 
office. However, when the tifty or so protesters 
congregated on 30 May, they were soon outnumbered 
by thousands of Timorese who gathered to express 
support for the Bishop. · When Belo came out, he 
invited the people to join him in prayer, then ex-
plained why he had sent the letter, to loud cheers of , 
suppo.rt. Needless to say, this spontaneous mass rally 
in Dili went unreported in the Indonesian press. i1f 
VATICAN AMBASSADOR ISOLATES BELO 
Echoing the views ot senior Indonesian figures, 
Cardinal Canalini, the Pope's ambassador in, Jakar-
ta, declared that Bishop Belo~s approach to ' the UN 
was done on his own responsibility and the Catholic · 
Church was not involved. 
In an interview with Jakarta Post, he suggested 
that although Belo is head of the diocese of East 
Timar, hie letter does not reflect the aspirations 
either of the Church or the people of East Timor. 
He said that East Timor is a 'political issue', that . 
bishops are concerned with pastoral affairs while ' 
political issues should be dealt with on the interna-
tional forum. [Jakarta Post, 14 June 1989] 
Canalini apparently believes that whereas car-
dinals like himself can make a political statement on 
behalf of the Church and people of East Timor, the 
head of the diocese is not entitled to do so. 
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1\vo embassies refuse 
to help asylum,seekevs 
~11 Jun¢,. tl\r;ee ~febatfsi;~i in J'ak11rta, the s,;,~dis):i, 
,ra.ptlnes~. e.nd. Vatic~ri epibaasie~, al~ rei'us.ed . t;o g~ye 
refuge to six ]?ast Timorese students wh() were on the 
run l!-nd ir:1 . grave danger of . ~rest by tp.e secutlty 
authoHties • . Five of them, Fel!'nll.ndo de Araujo, Avelinb 
Qoelho ~ Silva, Agapito Cardosa, Car16s da Silva 
J;.opes and Marciano Garcia da Silva, a.long with Lucas 
da Costa and Miguel Amaral Guterres. had fled from 
Bali to Jakarta after a fellow student, Elia.a Pereira 
Moniz., .• was arrested in Bali on 14 June • . In Jakarta, 
1)1:igue1 Amaral Guterres, dist1.ppeared and is still not 
ac:~oµnted . !or •.. '.l,'heticon 15 June, Luc~ d,a . Co$ta. was 
arrested., ·causing the ~~mailifPg fiye. PtUs a~ot}ler 
studel').t at a university in .Tall'.arta, Joao d9s Reis, to ··· 
have grave fears for their own safety. · 
M()Dil;' ~rr~st hi believe.d to be conne~ted with ma.~s 
a.rr~st~ in Baucau and Dili sin.ce April (see se:P~ate 
item} when names of contacts in Indonesia were forced 
out of detilinees during interrogatJ_on and torture. 
On Friday 16 June, they went. to the Swedish 
~~l;>a.ss;Yto . asJt .. for retuge•· Tl1eY were r¢!,Used ·lielp, 
and warned that if they did not leave the premises, 
tl:le security forces would be sutnmoned to remove 
~:hem• .. Agcprdir,ig . to e:19urces in Jak~ta . wl;lo wei;-e)n 
contact with the students at ,the time, they were s9 
4.f:r~d of .what qtlght bef.1111 theiµ tfi~.t they were. not 
;p;-epa:red to .delay .their. embassy attempt by a.tdngle 
q~1't At tjle first .. opportunity on ~onday- mormng, 19 
Jµl'.l,e, t~e siJC. wer;i.t .... to t~e :Vatiq&n \ a11d Japanese 
elllbassielfJt succee.ded in gaining entry and .11s\<ed to 
lbedP.lowed to stay in orde:r to get asylum a}>~d. 
Indonesia's F():reign Minister, Ali Ala.1;.as, t~e1l began 
tA:> me.ke . stateq},ents a.ccu1dng .. the six. of . beip.g m--1n-
~9r~ed. lie cW.!Ded they wer,e not in. any dange:i:-, .. tht1t;J 
1Da~in$H< eas~ . for .the enib~s~es.to . refuse to Prc>tect 
~he students . ~?\d . avoid da.ma~ing . Uieir . bilateral 
re,latjc,;ins with J~arta. 
~~~Ill~ .. ····· . The Vatican e.mbassador, Cardip.al :Franc.esco Cap.alip.t, 
saw the.· 4>.cident .as ye~ ano.ther ;potentially emb~ 
ras•f P.• obs~le . in Vatican/~ndcm."~J&l} .. reJ,tiop.s, ~()lJ.owitlg t~e t1,P:pefll to the VN ~st February ~Y 
Bishop Belo tor a plebisc.i~ .to be held on East Timor's 
future, and coming four months · before the Pope's 
highly controversial visit to • rndp.pe~i.a . an<i l!laat.Tim()r. 
On.~.o June, ~tincispo Lopes d11 .. c.ru~, f()rmer deputy 
sovernor ot .. East Timor .. and now a member of Suhar--' . . .. •.· ... '. . ... . . •. .. ..... to s .. ·. Supreme . ~dvi8()ry . Council, went to .· the. Vati~an 
emb~s;y at the behest e>f Ali Ala.tas ,tt.nd succeeded in 
perst1adJ?,l.S the four student& to leave~ Although a 
Vatican f?Dl~a&s¥ <>flJcla,~ was quote<J a.s sa~·Jpg that the 
students we:r~ . 'a!rald of torture and . that they mi(ht 
be arrested• [Reuters. 20 JuneJ, Canali~i .later ~­
sertedt "We . d~9 not ~eel they neeq.e<i as~ium." [Mer-
deka 22 June, quoting AFPJ, thus acc;~pting Indonesi..-
an claims and reje~ting tbe students' fears~ Hj;l .chose 
to ignore a complajnt Bishop Belo . ha,d maqe about 
represE?ion in East 'J'imor in .. his Pastoral Le~ter of 5 
Dec~mber 1988 [see .. TAeoL B,uJletin, .No 91, February 
1989. P 13] a.s well as information he had received 
'Welcome to Dili' is the message for new arrivals at 
Dili Airport, in Indonesian of course. 
Photo: Jakarta Post 
directly frotn Bishgp B"'lo in February, reporting a 
number o! extra-Jp.~icial killings, maltl'eatment and 
arrests in East Tbnor. The Vatican has, by this act of 
betrayal, shown call()US dinegard for the sufferings 
of the East Timorese • people. 
The Japanese Government tteated the students just 
as callously. It waa iµnde~. strong p;-essure in Tokyo 
from the Diet Forum . for • E!tJ.st. Timor and the · Free . East 
Timor Japan Cqalition. However, it rlgtdly fl.tuck by its 
policy of refusing asylu.m to anyone not on Japanese 
territory, evep. though the ·two student~ at the 
embassy were undeniably on Japanese territory. 
By acted speedily to end the embassy attempts witP. 
the support of the governm~nts concerqed, Ind,onesia 
we,s .able to pre--empt a move by Portq~al to pro~de 
the. students with Portuguese passports which woul.d 
have enabled them to . leave the countl'f• As soon .as 
the. stu.dents • entere.dthe tw6 elllbassies, . Lisbon. ~ked 
the. Dutch goyernment tO seek .clarification abol.lt the 
stµdents' intentions . but things .moved too . fast tor 
this to haye any effect.. · ·•· · . .: 
Following their reJnoval froni .the emba.ssies1 the six 
student.s were talfe:n. to the homes of h10 East ~or- ' 
ese in Jakarta, Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Salvador 
Ximenes Soares. 
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A cover-up 
Only one Jakarta new!!lpaper, Jakarta Post, c~e 
anywhere near to revealing the reason for the stu-
dents' bid for asylum. On 22 June, the paper reported 
that the students were suspected of 'involvement in 
subversive activity', having set up an underground 
network and taken moves against T.imor•s integl"ation 
with Indonesia. It also reported, quite correctly, that 
the students had sought refuge because they were 
alarmed by Lucas da Costa's detention. 
The security authorities did not allow this to go 
unchallenged, as it contlicted with the official line 
that there were no grounds !or them to fear persecu-
tion. On 24 June, all Jakarta newspapers, includins 
Jakarta Post, quoted Armed Forces spokesman, 
Brigadier-General Nurhadi as denying that the 
students were blacklisted or suspected of subversion. 
All Timorese students studying in Indonesian unlver-
sitiea, he said, 'were ~arefully screened' before being 
given government sc1Jola.rships. He claimed that the 
students who had now left the embassies 'will not be 
interrogated' though they 'will be asked about their 
asylum bid.' But it is a 'sensitive issue', he said, 'so 
we mus.~ move slowly'. He alt,JO denied that anyone had 
been arrested in East Timor. [Jakarta Post and 
Merdeka, 24 June 1 Not a single newspaper in Jakarta 
has challenged this blatant lie. 
Thus have Japan's and the Vatican's consciences 
been salved, while the six . students now remain in 
Jakarta, at the mercy of the security forces. Lopes da 
Cruz told the press that the tour students at . his 
home were 'too exhausted and overwhelmed by fe$r' 
to meet journalists. [Kompas, 23 June] Japanese 
F9reisn'. Ministry ,, offictajs in Tok)"Q ipsisteci that t~~ir 
embassy had made no commitment.' to keep in con~t 
with the students it had expelled, to check on their 
safety. [Japan East Timer Memo, No 6, July 1989] • 
The 1986 embassy asylum attempt 
In October 19$6, four East Timorese students sougl]t a.s,vlu1¥ E+t. the putch embass,v in Jaka.:r.ta. 
The attempt failed because the Dutch amb4ssador colla.borateq with the Indonesian authoritfes 
and forced the four to leave after promising that they wo1,1.Jd get Portu,guese pa,sfi),pgrts. Tf),e 
full facts of how the students were tricked b;v Dutch embass,v officials have been revealed .to 
TAPOL by Abilio Sereno, one of the four. He left Jakarta illegally earlier this year and is .now 
living in Lisbon. This is his story. · 
A short while be!ore we decided to seek refuge in the 
Dutch embassy, a clandestine group which had been 
channelling information from East Timor tQ the world 
outside was exposed and the following three members 
were arres~d. 
On 3 September 1986, Antonino Goncalves, 34, from 
Abilio Sereno 
Atsa.be, was arrested at Atma Jaya Cath()lic U!liveralty 
and held i'or a month and eight days. On 16. Septem-
ber, Joao Freitas da Camara, 29, from Zumalai-Suai, 
was . arr~sted at hi~ residen~'·· in . Central Jakarta and 
held tor 25 days. On 17 September, Francisco Fernan-
des da Silva, from Viqueque1 was arrested and held 
tor 24 days. All thre~ were hltndfolded .be.tore be{n~ 
driven to· their place of detention ,and then treated 
like common criminals and ma.de to do forced labour. 
On 1l Octobertthe three were released, after beifig 
obliged to sign interrogation reports denying that 
they had been maltreated under detention. They were 
warned not to tell anyone what had happened to them. 
Following their release, they ·were harassed ·by 
secret agents using surveillance eq1.dJ:lJI10nt, w}lo 
trailed them on their way to school and :on their way 
home, watching their every step. 
Then on 17 October, an agent, 'Arnoldus Koli Mali, 
advised the students to 'take a holiday' in · Dili~ .He 
offered th~m free tickets for the trip and also made 
the same offer to Abtlio Oliveira Sereno 
At the Dutch 6abua7 
Fearing that this attempt to persuade us to return 
to Pili would leadto Our eliminat!(Jni ~e dec.ided ~ 
seek refuge in the Dutch embassy. We entered the 
Dutch embassy at 10 am on 20 Oc~ber{but !J:.om the 
start, embassy . officials . did everything ... possible, • w 
persuade us to leave. On 21 October in the middle of 
th~ night, "'e were wok~n and told that the · ambas-
sad9r wanted see us . . Wht?n \lie met him, . h'e told us 
that we must leave the. errtb~ssy; if we,,did not·Teave 
'voluntarily', he would . call the police. to hiive us 
evicted, He warned us that he would accuse 'us of 
er}teriri~ the emb~$y to commit a r?hbe17. 
We had meanwhile been told tha(the . emba~sy was 
preparing Portuguese passports · tor us to leave for 
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Lisbon and that Holland and Indonesia had agreed 
that these Portuguese passports could be issued to 
enable us to leave country. But we did not want to 
leave the embassy until the passports had been 
issued and we could leave under Dutch protection. 
The next morning, four Indonesians, Dr Gerard 
Bonang1 Himawan Djaja Endra1 John Tinggogoy and 
someone whose name I don't know came and told us 
that the police were preparing to come and remove 
us from the embassy by force. We then re1,1.Used that 
we had no choice but to leave wlth these four In-
donesians. 
Dutch eaba.ss:y bet.rayel 
After leaving the embassy, we were constantly haras-
sed, and felt very insecure. People we did not know 
kept phoning us and asking where we went to 
church, who we went to visit, and so on. 
During the first few weeks after leaving the embas-
sy, we tried to visit the embassy a number of times 
but were refused .centry • . Laf:,er, we were able .. to meet 
Dutch embassy officials but only at Erasmus House, a 
Dutch cultural centre. 
On 24 November, Pieter van der Donck1 head of 
Portuguese affairs at the Dutch embassy, told us that 
Portugal had issued our passports and tickets. How-
ever, he said, i! the passports were $iven to us, this 
would make our presence in Indonesia illegal (because 
Portuguese passport-holders are not allowed to visit 
Indonesia) which meant that we couldbe arrested. If 
this happened, the embassy would do nothing to help 
us. So, even though the passports were ready, he 
refused to give them to us. This just shows how the . 
Dutch did everything possible to help the Indonesians 
prevent us from leaving. van der Danek even advised 
us to stop trying to leave and to return to our 
studies. 
All this time, we had no incomes but the embassy 
gave u.s no. support at all. They did not even help us 
to buy medicine or pay for medical treatment when we 
fell ill. Nor did the International Red Cross want to 
help; they were afraid they . would be expelled from 
Indonesia thus jeopardising their work in East Timor. 
Bribing ·my way out 
Faced with such a predicament, our Portuguese 
lawyer, Loff Barreto, suggested that we apply for 
Indonesian passports and exit permits and leave the 
country in this way. It was difficult for us to accept 
this because it meant agreeing to abandon our right 
to Portuguese citizenship and to accept being In-
donesians. Nor was it clear that the Indonesian 
authorities would give us passports and allow us to 
leave. 
In the end, I decided to leave Indonesia illegally but 
could not convince my three colleagues to join me 
becat,1se they refuse to accept Indonesian passports. 
The only way l could do this was by bribing officials 
to give me an Indonesian passport and exit permit~_ 
As my.· three friends refused to do this, I decided to 
leave on my own. It cost me 6 million rupiahs (about 
£2,200) to buy my Indonesian pe.S•port and a ticket to 
Macao. 
I left Jakarta. at 6.30 am on 31 January 1989, and 
arrived in Macao via Hong Kong at 4.30 pm that day. 
I immediately phoned Loft Barreto who contacted the 
Portuguese government. Within days, arrangements 
had been .. made for me to travel to Lisbon and I 
arrived 'tn Lisbon on 14 February. 
* * * * 
EASTTIMOR 
~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 
AbWo Sereno'• bacltaround 
After being with Fretilin in the bush, Abilio was one 
of those instructed to surrender in 1979 and go into 
Indonesie.n-occupied . East Timor. He had not fought 
with arms but was involved in political work as a. .... 
political assistant. He continued to do this, clandes- .,. 
SERENO ON RECENT ASYLUM ATTEMPT 
I am shocked by what has. happened. After the 
recent events in China, when many embassies were 
willing to give refuge to students fleeing from the 
authorities, neither Sweden, the Vatican nor Japan 
were willing to help these six East Timorese stu-
dents. The world has forgotten East Timar. Most 
governments in the world are only worried about 
their economic interests. 
The Vatican has shown itself to be totally uncon-
cerned with humanitarian principles. Only recently, 
the Vatican was trying to persuade our resistance 
fighters to surrender to the Indonesians. The 
Vatican is unwilling to side with the cause of 
justice; they side only with the forces of evil. 
As for Japan, the country with the largest in-
vestments in Indonei:sia, it is more interested in 
economic affairs than in human rights. 
Nor should we forget that our comrades also tried 
to get refuge in the Swedish embassy, but the 
embassy told them tq leave, as if they were thieves 
trying to gain illegal entry. This amazes me. This 
as a violation of international law. Sweden always 
claims to uphold the principles of human rights and 
international law, yet this is nothing but lip-
service. When the six faced such d11nger, Sweden 
behaved just like the Vatican and Japan. 
I call upon the international community to con-
demn the Vatican and the governments of Japan 
and Sweden in the strongest terms. 
--- -·~-~' 
Indonesia Publications 
Subscribe t.o twice-weekly Indonesia News Service 
($182 US, $189 Canada, $238 elsewhere) 
Subscribe to Briefing Books (looseleaf in folders) 
The Indonesian Military Elite ($19) 
Law and Political Liberty in Indonesia ($57) 
The Petition ot 50 Group and the Tanjun• Priok 
Incident ($23) 
Transmigration, the Environment and Indigenou• 
Peoples ( $34) 
Political Islam in Indonesia ($39) 
Irian Jaya ($24) East Timor ($21) 
Indonesia's Economy ($37) 
Recent Dissertations on Indoneaia ($15) 
Briefing Books postage ($7 air, $2 sea per book). 
Special to TAPOL readers: a free sample copy for 
those considering subscribing to INS. A 10% reduction 
on prepaid orders of any one or more of the Briefing 
Books. Write to: Indonesia Publications, 7538 Newberry 
Lane, Lanham-Seabrook, MD 20706, USA 
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tinely, in Dill. After re-establishing himself in society, 
he was given permission in 1981 to go to Java to 
study. 
The education given us by Indonesia is intended to 
erase our Timorese Identity and support the idea that 
we are all Indonesians. But I can assure. you, most 
Timorese studyfns in Indonesia retain strong nation-
alist feelings and oppose integration, 
In August last year. he and Joao Comara met Europ-
ean Parliament members Jansen van Raay for 10 
minutes and Seate Weber for h&lf an hour at Hotel 
Indonesia, Just before they left tor the airport. They 
told them about conditions in Timor1 about the feel-
ings of Timorese students and gave them copies of a 
statement but were disappointed that the MEPe did 
not use this in Strasbourg. 
Sereno studied business management at the Faculty 
of Economics of the Catholic Atma Jays. University in 
Jakarta. 
It is standard practice for the rectors and lecturers 
of all universities and academies where East Tlmorese 
students study to be approached by army intelligence 
and told to keep an eye on Timorese students. They 
have to eavesdrop on their conversations with In-
donesians and among themselves. They must report on 
their studies and whether they are for or against 
integration. Even chauffeurs and people who run food 
stalls in the vicinity are told to spy on the Timorese 
students. • 
Mass graves near Viqueque 
Two lists of East Timorese buried in mass graves in 
places near the town of Viqueque have been sent 
to TAPOL by a private individual who visited a. 
number of areas in the eastern part of East Timar, 
in May this year. The lists were given to him by a 
person whose name cannot at present be divulged. 
One of the mass graves is located in Cassesse, 
near Viqueque; the list consists of 36 names of 
people murdered by Indonesian troops of Battalion •.. 
501 and buried on 13 Septembei· 1983. The other , 
grave is situated in Tahu-Wen, north of Viqueque, 
with a. li~t of 29 names of people, also murdered by 
troops of Battalion 501, who were buried on 17 
September 1983. •·· 
There is an urgent need for this information 1 D 
be the subject of an independent inquiry. > 
Ujung Pandang student leader on trial 
A student leader, Juliadi, has been on trial in Ujung 
Pandang, accused of inciting students to demonstrate 
during protests in the city against a police regulation 
obliging motorcyclists to wear helmets. At least five 
people were killed on 31 October 1987 when troops 
opened fire on thousands of students and others who 
were out on the streets in protest. [See TAPOL 
BulJetin, No 84, December 1987] 
Juliadi was chair of the Students' Consultative 
Board of the Engineering Faculty of the Muslim 
University in Ujung Pandang. The prosecution has 
called for a one-year sentence. 
The only reports of the trial, as far as we know, 
have appeared in a regional newspaper, Fsjsr. In his 
defence plea 'Nopember Berdarah, Moral Force Mahas-
iswa' (Bloody November. the Students' Moral Force), 
Juliadi rejected the charge that his involvement in 
the drafting of a document addressed to the South 
Sulawesi regional assembly amounted to inciting the 
students to protest. As the accused read out his 
statement, university students who filled the court 
enthusiastically applauded many of his remarks. Nor 
was he the only person who drafted the document, he 
said, so why was he now the only person on trial? 
[Fajar, 19 May, quoted in Indonesia News Sel'vice, No 
185, June 21, 1989] 
At the previous hearing, Juliadi's defence team 
called for his acquittal and immediate release. They 
argued that the demonstration in Ujung Pandang on 
31 October 1987 was not incited by the accused, who 
became involved only after hearing that students 
were demonstrating outside his university in Ujung 
Pandang. Realising that there had already been Joss 
of life, Juliadi and others went out to calm the stu-
dents down and urge them to channel their protests 
to the regional assembly. At the assembly building, 
they were met by a member who told them to return 
on Monday with their demands. In preparation for thi~ 
sec.ond visit, Juliadi and others drafted the document 
which. was now being used to accuse . him of incite-
ment. When they visited the assembly as requested~\ 
the document which expressed the'll.splratlons of the 
students, was read out. [ Fajar, 24 April, in INS, No 
176, 19 May 1989J 
The court's verdict was expected some time in June. 
We have not seen press reports about any other 
hearings of this trial. * 
... 
Anti-helmet demonstrators in action in Ujung Pandang 
on 31October1987. {Photo: Tempo, 14 November 1987] 
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•<()n trial to set an example 
it ba:s, i:>ecome clear to slupents in
1 
Jogjakarta that the 
t r ia ls ,,,ag.ainst the two I}ampangs (see Ta.pol Bulletin, 
))o~,1f~L,ar~ betng use<l by the ~ authorities to set an 
~ple and,J>Ut Q. halt to the rapid grq:wth of ~tudent 
study gr~lups. ,Barnbang lsti Nugroho is an active 
,me;m~r of lJ. study group while Bambar~g Subono is 
~n1y marginally involved. ,Hence they represent the 
1fw~ extremes of study-group activists, yet both are 
'.oo t rial for subversion. 
'T~;rt:Qri&ing a ~tud.7 group 
B~bang Isti Nug,roho as coordinator of the KSSPY 
( Kelompok . St;u9,i Sqsial Palagan Jo~jakartal study 
grQup~ is P.eing tried because ,0f some general remarks 
,h e made ,about the present situiitfon. As argued by 
) !i111bar Demokrasi, (Forum for Democracy), a bulletin 
'published by students in ·Jogja., remarks made by 
community leaders or even current or former high 
officials, are far more critical than Isti's remarks. If 
Public Prosecutor Ritonga S.H. pushed his argument 
to its logical conclusion, Wirogunan Prison would be 
chock Jul• with subversion suspects. (Mim,b1,tr Dem,ok-
ra'si, June 1989): " 
The prosecution and the military intelligence are 
determined to destroy the KSSPY study group. At an 
early stage, in July last year, a young Muslim student 
named Anharuddln, also connected with the study 
group, was detained and put under extreme' pressure 
to testify against fsti- Nugtoho or lbe put on trial for 
befog an 'Islam Komunis'. All he was required tO say 
was that Nugroho is a communist .cadre. On 4 August 
1988, Anhari.1ddin was released, . bot the military 
intelligence and the prosecution wer~ not . satisfied 
with this one witness. . 
During court sessions on 25 and 30 May the prose-
cution' br6ught 4 other witnesses to court, two of 
them, Pa.nji . Patah and Ignasius Untoro, as founder-
members · c:if ' the Palagan study group. ).gain the 
intention was to have the witnesses testify against 
Nugroho but it was not e,ntir~ly successful. Both 
founder'·membei's admitted having disagreements with 
the defendant on certain matters,' such as deciding 
who.to invite ~s speakers from out~dde and,. what kind 
of topips sho\,lld be discussed. Both witnesses were in 
a bad state,• in particular Panji Patah, who could not 
walk without the help of two attendants. Another 
witness, Sumadya Widada, now working at the same 
university . as tKe defendant, 11.lso testified that he 
disagreed with Nugroho on many occasioni;; and on one 
occasion heard the defendant say that the present 
governme,nt was not democratic,. Suma.dya also ref-
erred to. another Palagan study group member, ,Bonar 
Tigor Naipospos (said .. at the time to be on the run), 
who described the government as undemocratic and 
militaristic. (Tigor was arrested in -la,karta on 21 June 
and taken to .Togjak{!.rta for interrogation.] , 
As, in the earlier _sessions, . the atmosphere in the 
courtroom was lively. The public gallery was filled 
mainly witP, . student,!? who yelled and cheered every 
time the defendant or his LBH defence team started 
arguing with . the .prosecutor. Chief Judge Zulkifli 
Lu bis S.H. at one point threatened to close th,e court 
and transfer the trial to Jakarta.. 
&mbena Subono. no rlcht to dJtter 
Bambang Subono who is being tried at the same time 
in a different courtroom, !aces different charges. 
lnitia.lly f,i:rrested for ' possessing and selling Praii10e-
dya An~nta Toe r's books, , he- is now also ac-cused of 
holdin~f'· 'improper' views on the events of 1 October 
1965, the moment when General Suharto gr,abbed 
power. The prosecutor said that, on one occasion, he 
:expressed 'the vie·w that the 'G30S Affair' was simply 
an internal conflict within the Indonesian armed 
forces, a view held, in differing versions;· by most 
Indonesian!sts abroad who have studied those events. 
T-he official version is that -the Indonesian Communist 
Party was responsib1e ,, for ' the murder of the six 
generals. Bambahg Subono sald in his opening state-
ment that he had merely .raised a question about the 
views of Professor Wertheim, an academic in Ure 
Netherlands who has writtenfrequently on the ll)atter. 
·An attempt by the prosecution to incriminate Ba.m-
bang fo1' selling Pramoedya's books failed completely. 
A Catholic priest, Dr. J.A.T.Weitjens~ admitted buying 
Rumah Kaea, a novel by Pramoedya, trom the defen-
dant. But this was several days before ,the Attorney 
General Suka:rton bann.ed the book. ',When Chief Judge 
Djajusman asked the P'riest: "Why were you attracted 
tO this book?", _he replied: 0 Has this anything to do ... 
with the Bambahg case?" When the judge said there ., 
'Subversive!' cries the p1·os~cutor. 'For being criti-
cal!' replies the defence. The sc8les weigh up 'justice' 
and 'career', as the two Bambangs look on. 
Mimba.r,.Dem9krasi. June 1989 
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was a connection, the witness replied: "I am not 
prepared to answer the question". He denied knowing 
anything about the defendant's views or knowing 
about the existence of the Palagan study group: "I 
only heard about it from the prosecutor, during my 
interrogation''. Another witness, also a Catholic priest, 
Romo Setyakarjana, denied receiving books from the 
defendant and admitted reading a photocopy from a 
colleague. 
The two tritlls are still in progress, 
While the authorities hope that the trials will serve 
to intimidate study gro\lp activists, students fo Jog-
jakarta have used them to consolidate their movement 
and mobilise more support from students. 
Study ,group activist arrested 
A student named Bonar Tigor Naipospos, frequently 
mentioned fn the Bambarigs' trials as being 'still on 
the run', was arrested in Jakarta. on 21 June arid 
tliken to Jogjakarro for interrogation. He is under-
s.!:;Ood to be a founding member of the Palaga Group 
which is at the centre of IstiNugroho's trial. 
(Sources: Pelita 23 May . 1989; · Surabaya Pos 5 May 
1989; Kedaulatan Rakyat 1, 5 and 15 May, 1 and 6 June 
1989; Suara Merdeke. 15 May 1989 ), * 
LETTERS OF CONCERN 
Thirty-one Australians, including academic~, boo~ 
editors 9-nd human rights ~cthrists, ha.ve signed l:l-n 
appeal to the Indonesian ~mtho'.rities to drop ~l the 
charges against the two Bambangs, who . were 
doing .no ~ore than providing a forum for discus-
sion of developments in Indonesian society, art and 
culture", They also call on the recently esf.tibUshed 
Australia. Indonesia Institute to affirm .that it will 
be difficult to achieve its aim of cultural and 
intellectual interchange "if there is a possibility 
that participation in a · .discussion on literature 
between Australians and Indonesians can later be 
used as the basis of charges or subversion a~ainst 
any Indonesian who took part". 
In West Berlin, the dissident Indonesian organisa-
tion, .. Ge1·llkf!n demihak-hak ausi d~n demokrasi 
(Movement for. Basic . Rights and Demooracy) urged 
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to demand 
that Indonesia withdraw all charges and release the 
two defendants. 
Discrimination against ex-tapols condemned 
Responding to a press repq;t I.hat the.re a.re e,597 
people in Jakart;A whose identity cards (KTP) be1:1r the 
special code 'ET' (fox 'ex;-ta.pol') which was publjshed 
ii;i Mei·deka on 1 H~rch 1989, th~ Institute f9r the 
D~fence of Huma9 Rights in Jakarta w:ro~e .. J.<;> the 
Goverl'lor of Jakart;a on the same day calUng this an 
act of discriroiriatiqn a,g'!-inst former prisoners becaqse 
it subje.cts them to apecial .tre~tinent. 
Th~ ll'lstitute's .chair, HJC ... Princen wrote: '1Da4i 
provided by the Laksusda (regional executive offic~r 
of .the special security comipand, fqrmerly Kopkamtib, 
now: Baskorsronas) is il'l effect ,fl trial for .those in 
question, a verdict that has beell passed without any 
process in a court of law." He drew attention to 
Artic:les l to 7 of the Vlltv:erE;a,,l Declart+tion .ot Huinan 
Rights ~nd . expressed the hope that mell!bers of the 
J11karta. legi~fotjve . asse!Ubly would question the 
Laksusda and tl}e . J~karro administration on thi$ 
violatioQ of human rights and infringe!Uent of the 
Con$titu!;.ionwhich guaranteesfreedom for IndoneJiiian 
citizens. 
Although the letter was circulated to the press, it 
was :r:iot publi~hed J>Y anyone. Princen is . a 'b11nned 
person' w~ose utter11nces may not be quoted in the 
press. 
Special BT travel documents 
An example of the special treatment mentioned by 
Princen ls the requirement for ex-ropols to obtain a 
travel permit if they wish to make a journey from 
their home town. Along with a copy of Prlncen 's 
letter, TAPOL has also received a copy of a travel 
permit (surat izin bepe1·gisn) issued on 14 March 1988 
to a woman "!hbse KTP beau the ET code. The permit 
specif~es that the holder is permitted to visit members 
of. her famU;v for 15 days, that on arrival at her 
destination, ahe must report to the local administra-
tive office and after returning hornet must again 
report to the issuing office to return the permit. If 
the permit is not used within three months, it will 
expire. 
'Clean ttnyilQmaent' 
Meanwhile, members of parlia.~ent have call.ed on. the 
security authorities to issµe a . definitive . s~tement . of 
what is me~nt by ' .be~s.ih lingkupgtll'J 1 (cl~,g.n .enYiron-. 
'rAJ?OL Occa11doru!l.l Reports Serie• 
no. 1 Exch$nge of Mes~gee with Fretilin p;>mlAIUld~r, 
Xanana G~emao 
with Lc>rd Avebury, chair Parliame~tat;Y Human 
Rfghta Group and Carmel Budtardjo; TAPOL 
Or.ganising Secretary. 
no.2 Joint . St.atememt. .. by ;uruon of .. DemocratJc .. Tlmoreee 
and F~tilin, March 1986 
no.3 Reactions from ·· IDdonelilla. to Traneml1ratlon 
Campaign 
lndonealan pr~ss cJippil'l&B rea<;Ung to . the campaign 
b;y Survival. Interl'l!ltional and Tapol, 
no.4 TAPOL Statem~mt on Eaat Tlmor to the UN Committee 
of 24, Auguet 1986 
no.5 .. ',('pe 1987 In.don.e.si&n Elet;Uon . ln East. Timor 
An anal:rsis written ·by TAPOL 
~9·.e: .TAPOL Sf:.atement on Eaat '.1'imor to tqe UN .Committee 
~t 2,4, A~guat 1987 
no.1 · J11I:r .. 1987 Sttt.tement on the Joint. l)eclafon ot the 
C~r~ ••. o( the . ~up~me .eo11rt and /ff$niater of 
JustlQ41. · • · · · · · 
by IKAJ?IN, the Indonesian Lawyers' Aal!O(:l.ation. 
n0.8 World Bank maintain• •u~port ,Or Tranamignt.tlon 
~urVival . In~rnatfonal at)d .TAPOL write tQ· World 
Bank, 22 • Jatj~rY 1988. 
no.9 TAPOL Sta~ment on ~t Timor to the UN Co11mitf;ee 
ot .24, Auguet 1988 
Copies from TAPOL, 50 ),)enc~ a copy (80 pence Including 
postage). 
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ment). [No-one in parliament, it appears, hn.s asked 
for this obnoxious form of discrimination to be ended. ] 
Parliamenes Commission JI felt that the use of this 
term is a source of grea.t public anxiety. According to 
one member, 'clenn environment' has an impact on the 
promotion prospects of government. employees. [Jawa 
Pos, 6 July 1989J 
Although offic:ials of Bakorstanas and its predeces-
sor, Kopkamtib, repeatedly insist that 'bersih 
Iinglmngan' is not a.n ofi'icia.l term and has, as it 
were, appeared from nowhere, the discrimination to 
'
· .. :v·. 
I ~ , . 
J 
~'--~( 
ti" ~"'//' 
A<imiral Sudomo 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
I 
which so many people have been subjected is based 
on Kopkamtib instructions issued in 1982 regarding 
'assessment of environment' during the sq·eening of 
persons being considered for government employment. 
Admiral Sudomo, now Minister-Coordinator for Political 
and Security Affairs and former Kopkamtib commander 
spelled out what this meant last November [see TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 90, December 1988, page 15). 
TAPOL has now obtained a copy of an announcement 
by the West Sumatra Education Office from 1988 which 
H~ts the registration number .. !'! of applicants for jobs 
in the civil service who have passed Screening TeE)ts. 
The Announcement, No. 11.635/106.1.2/C-1988, con-
cludes with the fo1lowing statement: 
All applicants who have passed a.re required to 
possess a Ce:r.tificate of Clesn Environment [Surat 
Keter8ng8n Bersih Lingkungan] which should, if 
possible, be handed in when. filling in the Clearance 
Test Questionnaire or at the latest when , supplying 
additional information as specified in our previous 
announcement. 
Bakorstanas has . now promised to issue cr!teria 
regs;rding the 'classification of individuals', apparent-
ly to. replace the 1982 instructions. [ J.awa Pos, 7 July 
1989] ... 
No release although sentence has expired 
Two PKI prisoners whose sentences expired nearly 
two years ago are still in prison despite attempts to 
secu.J;;e ~heir release. Rewang, now 61 years old, who 
until 1965 was first secretary of the PKI's Central 
Java. provincial committee, was due fo.r release in 
January 1988 but he is stiU in ~ipinang Prison. No-
one has . answered appeals from his family for hill'l to 
be aUowec1 J1ome. The. other prisoner, Marto Suwandi! 
61 yea.rs old, who ,was alsp sentenced to life, a.nd 
whose sentenc:e was later also commuted to 20 years, 
is still in prison even though he was due,. for release 
in 1987. 
Rewang was arrested ln July 1968 along with many 
PKI leaders who tried to establish a base for con-
tinued activity against the Suharto regime in Blitar, 
East Java . . He was tried in 1971 and given a Ufe 
sentence in December 1971. The Jakarta High Court 
confirmed the sentence in 1975. He then > lodged 
another appeal but it too.k; 10 years for the Supreme 
Court to hear .it. In 1985, bis sentence was ''commuted 
from life to twenty years. It was only then, when his 
sentence had been finally confirmed, 18 years after 
his arrest, that his entitlement to remissioll began to 
take effect. Hence, he was denied the right to remis-
sion tor ten years, which migpt .have shortenect his 
sentence by thirty months •.. In other words, he . was 
penalised for appealing. It was only after 1985, in 
August .t986 a.nd j\ugµ$t 1987 that he was granted .two 
three-month remission,s. 
However unjust this was, still worse was to . coi:ne. 
When Jan"Uary 1988 came round, he was not rele~se,d 
and no-one has yet.explatned why. His defence ~wyer 
at the 1971 trial was Albert Hasibuan, n,ow active . in 
Oolkar and a member of Parl,iament. It ought not;. to be 
too difficult for him to get to the bottom of this 
shock,jng injustice and sepure Rewang's im,mepia.te 
release. -iC 
On trial for insulting the President 
A person named Endi Purnomo is on trial in ·Te gal 
District Court for insulting the President. l)nder 
Article 134 of the Criminal Code, he faces a. sentence 
of up to six years. 
As described in the weekly, Ediror [20 May 1989), 
the accused succeeded in .convincing a university in 
Tega.}, Universitas Psnca Sakti, to allow him to lecture 
to the students, claiming that be, was a researcher 
from a university in Banjarmasin. A lecturer in 
criminal law at the Tegal university told the court 
that she introduced the guest speaker to her class of 
students and left the room for ten minutes. On her 
return, the class 'had b,ecom~ tumultuous', with the 
speaJ<er denouncing the President and his wealth and 
accusing hlm of hypocrisy by urging . th~ people to 
live modestly while he himself lives extrs.vags.ntly. As 
she entered the · class, he was about to explain what 
he meant by saying that Suharto is dictatorial, but 
she intervened: "The discussiOn has gone astray and 
is dangerous." 
It is evident from the editor report that it was the 
UPS Rector who handed Endi Purnomo over to the 
security authorities. 1' 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 94, .August 1989 11 
Five-year search for two 'disappeared' sons 
A small trader from Cianjur, West Java, has spent the 
la.st five yea.rs appealing to the Indonesian authorities 
to help him trace the whereabouts of h is two sons 
who were arrested by the p0lice in Pakanbaru, West 
Sumatra. Dudu Abdullah has written to military, pOlice 
and civilian agencies, to Parliament and to the Vice-
President's special complaints box, to find out · what 
happened to Nano Permana 30, and Soni lskandar, 28, 
bul to no avail. 
The only proof that either of the two men was 
arrested is a warrant issued by the Pakanbaru chief-
of police on 18 August 1984 stating that Soni Iskandar 
was arrested on 16 August 1984 on suspicion of 
involvement in 'criminal activities of a political 
nature'. When Dudu Abdullah heard about his son's 
arrest, he told his older son, Nano, to visit his 
brother in Pakanbaru. Nano left Cianjur on 10 Sep-
tember 1984 but he too was arrested when he went to 
the police station to see his brother. 
Dudu Abdullah believes that , Soni was arrested 
because he was in possession of a. taped recording Of 
a speech by the Muslim preacher, Abdul Qadir Jaifo.ni. 
In mid-1~84, three well-known preachers, Abdul Qadir 
Jailani, A.M. Fatwa and Mawardi Nur, who are all now 
serving long prison sentences, visited Pakanbaru and 
~ave lectures. Nano, formerly 11 student at Bandung 
Islamic University, .was a member of the organising 
committee and recorded the lectures. Dudu Abl)llah 
believes that Soni took the tape to Pakanbaru and 
may have played lhern frequently, u1~ til he was 
arresLed by the police . · 
"If my two sons have done anything wrong because 
they had copies of t he tapes, I would accept that they 
should be punished. The qu estion for me is that they 
have never been tried, a_nd I don't know where they 
are now," said Dudu Abdullah. (Tempo, 20 Ma.y 1989] 
UN investigation . 
The disappearance of Dudu Abdullah's two sons was 
formally raised earlier t.his year with the UN Working 
Group on Enforced and Inv oluntary Disappearances, 
a special commiLtee of the UN's Centre for Human 
Rights in Geneva. The Working Grc;mp considered the 
case at ils E>ession in April and has asked the In-
donesian Government for clarification about the 
whereabouts of the two men. 
This procedure has rarely, it ever, been used in the 
case of disappearances in Indonesia. It is even more 
effective if the compl11int is presented to the Working 
Group within six months of the disappearance, in 
which case, emergency proceedings applied. ~ 
Badega 13 acquitted on app,eal 
The thirteen Badega. villagers· eadfor sentenced to 
7-16 months in jail for stealing state land, damaging 
marker posts and pulling up tea seedlings belonging 
to a plantation company, have been acquitted on 
appeal. The thirteen represent some 2,500 villagers 
who had been farming neglected land for over forty 
years. Their application for ownership rights was 
turned down and the land was leased to a private 
plantation company PT SAM. [see TAPOL Bulletin Nos. 
92 '& 93] The Bndega villagers have gained the sup-
port of a women's solidarity group who protested to 
House Speaker in January, and student protestors 
who organised a 63km prote.st mnrch lo Garut, where 
the trial was held. 
12 
The three appeal judges who acquitted the 13 said 
that the district court: should not have tried the case 
because it .was still beir~g processed by · the Home 
Affairs Ministry. While awaiting the decision of the 
Ministry, the farmers tnust be allowed to occupy and 
cultivate the land. According to the judges, il was for 
the villagers themselves to decide whether or not 
they wanted to surrender the land.f Jakarta Post 6 
July 1989] · · ~ 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial 
PubJished by: T APOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign 
Since early 1985; more lhan 150 Muslims have been lricd, convicted and sentenced to heavy . 
terms of iinprisonrnent in Indonesia for giving publitl scnnon.S critical of the ~ovemment. 
conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities. or producing leaflets or 
journals that denounce govcmment policy. Some. were held responsible for bombing 
incidents that were never properly investigai.¢. ' 
The trials followed the anny's craekdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 
1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when iroops opened fire on the .unatmed 
aowd. The trials wok place u a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military 
government's iinposilion of total ideological conformity. prevenilitg organisations from 
proclaiming Islamic or othe: religious principles. 
Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context pf the 
continuing conflict between Indonesia's Mmlims and the rrtilitaryregime. 
128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p. 
ISBN 0 950675148 
This publication is now svailable in BahasB 
Indonesia. A German translation is also in 
preparation. 
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Prayer;..meeting group on trial 
An undisclosed number of Muslims are on trial in 
Sull)ynep, . Me.du1-a, for allegedly having produced an 
'illegar pamphlet, t.he contents of which are con-
sidered to be subversive. 
The grou.r consists of virtually all people who 
regularly attended weekly p:ra.yer-meeting!il to discuss 
'ilmu tauhid', belief in One God. One of their number, 
Farid Majid, has already been tried and e;entenced to 
four Years. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 90, December 
1988] . 
One person ol1 trial is Ka.mil Mujib, .45 :years. The 
prosecutor has called for a 6-year sentence. The 
lndictment alleges that teachings at the prayer-
meeting hFtd so enthused the participants that they 
drafted two leaflets, one of which was entitled: 'Wake 
up before it's too late!' The leaflets were sent to many 
PO boxes, and when a lecturer at the Islamic Academy 
in Pa.mekasan and other officials received copies, they 
reported this to the security forces. 
Kamil Mujib's defence lawyers argued that the 
fodict.menL presented no evidence that any action he 
had taken was directed to ove1·throwing ·the lawful 
government .. Those attending the prayer-meetings ha.d 
criticised government policy, a right that should be 
enjoyed by e'V~ry citizen. '!'hey also denounced as 
unconstitutional the anti-subversioh law being used 
and called for it to be repealed. 
Th~ prosecutor said the defence lawyers had a. very 
shallow understanding of the law. It was not neces-
sary to prove that someone hud incited feelings of 
Fe.rid Majid on trial le.st · year. 
hntred and splits; it was eno1.1gh to prove1 as in this 
case, that the accused was aiming to do this even 
though nothing had actually been achieved. Ka.mil 
Majid committed . an act of subversion by joining the 
prayer-group leading to a conspiracy .to draft the 
'illegal' leaflets• ( Panji Me.s.varak.?.t, 10 July 19891 ic 
-
LAM PUNG 
Coffee-growers terrorised in Lampung 
In a · campaign to evict .thousands of families from 
their homes and tI;ieir S1nal1 coffee plantations, local 
officials supported by police and arpiy personnel have 
burnt down hundreds . of houses in the district of 
P~la4 Panggung in Lampung, located close to the 
southern tip o( Sumatra. Besides burning down 
houses, officials have felled coffee bushes, burnt 
coffee already hn't'vested, destroyed stores of rice and 
other foodstuffs, SIJlas}J.cd vehicles and extorted 
money from the inhabitants. 
Details of the destruction wrought during March, 
April and May this year are contained in a report by 
a team sent to the area by the Legal Aid Institute in 
Jakarta to investigate .. complaints by the people .. of 
Pulau Panggung. Copies of the report were released 
to the domestic and foreign press ih Jakarta i.l'l the 
first week of July and 'were given wide coverag~ in 
newspapers in some westexn 90\.11'.ltries. 
Bacltaroqund to the terror 
In the l950s .and 1960s, Pulau Panggung beca1Ue. one 
of the most popular .areas for .thousands of families in 
Jaya, hoping t.O improve their standard of living. Most 
pebple moving in were spontaneous trsnsmigrants who 
o\>tained permission to clear the forests and settle. 
Though efforts to plant ploye tr~es were unsuccess-
ful, coffee flourished and the newcomers turned Pulau 
Panggung into n prgfjl;{l.pl~ coffee-growing regio?l 
covering thousands of hectares of land. By growing 
rice, bananas and sweet potato for their own ne~ds 
and selling their coffee, the local peopl~ became quite 
well off; many families own their own vehicles to 
transport the coffee to points market, though l~al 
roads are little more than mud-tracks. 
In 1977, forestry officials began entering the a~ea 
to . carry /out reforestation, slashing down the coffee 
bu13hes and other crOP!'i• They said thfl.t the area had 
been accorded 'protected forest' status and .all the 
families must now move out. Resistance to .this in-
trusion led the people to send a letter of complaint to 
Parliament in January 1981. Things eased after that, 
l:)ut on 15 January 1988 !J,ll the inhabitants were 
summoned to a meeting . and told by fore,stry and 
transmigration officials tqat they must leave the area. 
They could either • transmigrate to Riau, t,o work at a 
PIR ( mtcleus/smallholders) plantation, or go els~where 
to set up home anew with their own money. T}lere was 
no question of anyone receiving compensation. But 
only those aged 20 - 35 yea.rs could join the PIR 
project. Moreover, the offer. applied only to new-
comers frotn , Java, nqt to . the original inhabitants, 
added to which,, some offic~s offered bribes to 
encourage people to leave, fuelling suspicion that the 
officials would be the ones to benefit. 
.Less than a. quarter of the families bothered to~ 
register for the new scheme. AccordiJlg to .. one report, ., 
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only 575 out of the 2,376 families living in the area 
agreed to move. [Jakarta Post, 2 January 1989] 
November burnings 
In November 1988, local sub-district chiefs assisted 
by security forces moved into an area called Datar 
Setujuh Satu, and started burning down people's 
houses. In many cases, the inhabitants had only one 
or two days' notice, giving them no time to remove 
their belongings. From 19 November till 7 December 
1988, altogether 476 houses were burnt down in more 
than a dozen hamlets and villages. According to press 
reports at the time, the officials were acting on the 
instructions of the military commander of South 
Sumatra, Major-General Poedjono Pranoto. [See TAPOL 
Bulletin, No 91, February 1989] 
The destruction was wanton and spiteful. Stocks of 
rice and coffee were spilt and other belongings, like 
hand-driven coffee-mills and household chattels, were 
smashed. Sub-district chiefs had hired dozens of local 
inhabitants, paying them Rp. 21500, a day to join in 
the pillage. 
After bitter complaints to the Jocal military command 
and the Lampung regional assembly and an outcry in 
the national press, the burnings stopped. Determined 
not to quit the area, aL least until the next coffee 
crop was harvested in April, the homeless families 
built themselves huts in remote; inaccessible areas. 
The suspicion grew that the officials wanted to evict 
them before April so that they would be able to 
harvest the crop themselves. 'rhe local people also 
noticed that reforestation did not take place in areas 
that had not been planted with coffee and that coffee 
bushes were only being felled at the outer edges of 
the huge area under coffee; it appeared unlikely that 
the officials would clear-fell all the many thousands 
of hectares under coffee cultivahion. 
Two months of wiltul destruct.ion 
On 11 March, the burnings started again. The LBH 
report lists the date and place of neatly fifty inci-
dents up to the end of May, when hundreds of 
people's homes were burnt down or wantonly destr-
oyed. Most of the burnings happened during the first 
month. In many instances, demands were made for 
cash and when this was not forthcoming, or less than 
the amount asked for was handed over, people were 
told to hand over their identity cards. Some demands 
for money were accompanied by threats that people 
would be branded as 'mujahiddin'. Vehicles were 
smashed, stocks of food were thrown onto the ground 
and poisonous weeds were m1xed in with stocks of 
rice. In one incident on 13 April, the sub-district 
chief waylaid a. man transporting about two tons of 
coffee and threw his nineteen sacks into the river. In 
some places, makeshift huts, built after the earlier 
burnings, were smashed and burnt. o'n 28 April, 
dozens of sacks full of rice or coffee were .burnt. 
Elsewhere on the same day, officials confiscated 
nearly half a milliori rupiahs from a home in 
Sukamulya, and for several days thereafter, hundreds 
of thousapds of rupiahs were taken from other 
inhabi.tants in the same area. 
On 17 May, sub:...dis~rict chiefs attended a meeting 
with all local police chiefs and village heads from 
throughout Pulau Panggung mid took three decisions: 
anyone still remaining in the area would be arrested 
and handcuffed, and no-one .· would be released 
without a payment of Rp. 50,000; all vehicles still in 
private ownership would be confiscated. It was also 
decided to keep seven hundred pairs of hand-cuffs 
ready for use. 
The last incident documented in the LBH report took 
place on 28 May. ..fc 
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Kedung Ombo: the forgotten families 
The situation at the Kedung Ombo dam, the World 
Bank-funded dam in Central Java, has deteriorated. 
Conditions for the families stranded in the dam are 
becoming more desperate. In the past four months 
eight people have drowned r h'.awssan 6 June 1989J. 
Poverty-stricken families are surrounded by water. 
They are not getting enough to eat, their lll.rid is 
submerged and they cannot earn money elsewhere to 
bl1y food as they are stranded on· "islands" created 
by the dam. 
Optimism generated by the Government's promise in 
May of replacement land near the darn for the oustee 
families has also faded fast. Less than half the people 
who refused to move from the dam area qualify for 
the new offer. Only those '600 families 'who owned land 
in areas now inundated by the dam and refused to 
collect their compensation from the local court will be 
allowed to take up the government's offer. 
According to the SolidaHty Group for the Kedung 
Ombo Dam Vict.ims fKSXPKO), only in one of the three 
districts affected by the dam, Boyolali, have fatme.rs 
been offered acceptable replacement land. In Sragen 
o.nd Grobongan, (he people are still being victimised 
by the authorities. When Catholic priest nnd social 
· worker, Romo Man gun, and a group of students tried 
to give boats to stranded villagers in Sragen district. 
· they were turned back by the authorities because 
they had not .gone through the ''proper channels". A 
report from Indonesia reveals the true reason: the 
donated boats threatened a profitable transport 
monopoly enjoyed by a local military officer, who was 
taking advantage of the :villagers' isolation for 
personal profit. Romo Mangun's boats have since been 
confil'lcat~d. KSKPJ{O is demanding that tl)e filling of 
the i·escrvoir be stopped , until the problems are 
resolved. £ .[alwrtn Post 2 July 1989), 
Punished for complying with goverruaent de.anda 
An estimated 800 families - those who owned no land 
.and those landowners who , collected their compen-
sation under pressure - will get nothing. It is ironic 
that those .families who obeyed the government by 
collecting their compensation, however unwillingly, 
are now being Jett out in Lhe cold. Tl)e more militant 
families who resisted the pressqre, once labelled as 
"remnants of the communist ,party" by President 
Suharto, have now been. hailed as "he.roes of develop-
ment" by the governor of Central Java. 
The government seems .to be saying ;that the families 
who rem1tin in the dam after collecting their compen-
sation have no right to expe~t anything else frqm the 
government. But they sta:; .. ed iu their makeshift homes 
in the (tam because their compensation was nowhere 
neitr sufficient to buy replacement land p.earby. The 
people are therefore being punished for a situation 
beyond their control. 
Land acquisition by book and. hT c.rook 
The World Dank has known for some time that the 
system of compensation in Indonesia is far from 
satisfactory. A report commissioned for the World 
Bank lenked to TAPOL reveals that: 
·there is little, oz· no cons11/tation with the owners on 
,1•8 tes of compl'nsation and in man.v cases the (exprop-
A woman cares for her grandchild, not sure whether 
her house will have to be moved again. as the waters 
1·Jse in Kedum( Ombo. 
riation) committee does not even see the owners, who 
«ire not of course represente4 on the Committee, 
except by their Lur·ah, who is a government appoin-
tee[p.16) ... The ra.tes are supposed to be based ' on 
current prevailing values, but ar:e frequentl,v out of 
date {p.16) ... In rural areas people ssy ·they recefre 
the full amount. written on the list, but that the area 
of their prol'erty often shows up as less than they 
think it is. If the area as measured is challenged, the 
committee will..,.11,sl< .to see the boundlir y- mBrks of the 
propert.v. or course no one has officiRI boundar.v 
marks, nor do the.v have official plot measurement by 
.the Csdastral Service so they are not in s strong 
position to dispute. {A review of land Bcquisition and 
resettlement under four World Bank financed projects 
in IndonP.si«J, June 1988 p.18]. 
The consultant's report also quotes a document 
passed to the Bank by the Legal Aid Institute, ac-
cording to which people received threats that they 
would be branded "OT"s (belonging to banned or-
ganisations) if they did not accept the compensation 
offered, that OTs would be transmigrated tc> .the island 
of Buru in Maluku, that their OT "contamination 
rating" would be Increased so that they could be im-
prisoned, or might be victtms of the misterius - the 
"unknown" vigilantes (of 1983) (p.49). 
The practice of officials deducting amounts. from the 
compensation payable to oustees is also mentioned in 
the con.sulta. nt'.s rep.· ort. Th~re ls no reason to believe .. 
that · these practices ha'te diminished over the past ... 
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year. If anything, they are likely to have become 
more widespread as the conflict has intensified. 
Abandoned b;y the Bank? 
The Bank's failure to address these problems is 
further evidence that human rights are not one of 
the Bank's ma.in concerns. In May, TAPOL wrote to the 
Bank saying: "It is not enough to respond to the 
demands of only 600 farriilies ... Only when all families 
have been adequately compensated can the dispute 
over compensation and resettlement at Kedung Ombo 
be considered resolved." On June 13 a further letter 
was faxed to Bank President Barber Conable, calling 
on him to clarify the actions ta.ken by the Bank on 
behalf of the families who did not qualify for the land 
offer. A rep})· assured TAPOL that "the detailed 
resettlement plan being developed .for the displaced 
families is directed at the total affected p6pulation". 
But this contradicts a report received by TAPOL 
from Jakarta that the World Bank is riot intending to 
take any action to ensure that the 800 families can 
stay near the dam. Instead it is preparing to launch 
an intensive campaign to persuade as many families as 
possible to transmigrate to Sumatra - an option the 
Kedung Ombo villagers have rejected all along .• The 
Bank admits too, that the compensatlon collected by 
the families IR not enough to buy land nenr the dam. 
Suharto · threw his full weight behind the trans-
migration option in a speech at Muko-Muko, a trans-
migration site in Sumatra where some Kedung Ombo 
oustees have been moved. Opening an .. irrigation 
project at the site, he delivered n speech hitting hard 
at those families remaining in the dam and reiterating 
that they should move to Muko-Muko. 
ivith t11eir school under water, children have lessons 
out in the open, with volunteers as teachers. 
Bank predicts increase in in\"Olunt.ar-7 reseWement 
Speaking at a seminar on re.settlement in Jakarta, 
D~pul.y Director of the World Bank, V. Rajagopalnn 
said that the need for involuntary resettlement wlU 
increase by about 50% in the year 2000 due to rapid 
worldwide urbani.zation. Wit.h thinly ve,iled reference 
to Kedung Ombo he said: 
Invo]unwn' rcseltleme11t is a difficult topic, which 
hllS nQt been handled with the care and sensitivity 
that it merits. Too often, it has been an add-on, an 
afte1-thought, in the pltmning of a mB.jor project. 
[Jakarta. Post, 20 June, 19891 • 
Above-average death rate among transmigrants 
The annual death rate for transmigrants is as high a3 
10-20 per thousand, far higher than the national 
average. This startling admission, which amounts to a 
reconfirmation that the transmigration programme has 
failed at the most basic human level, comes from a top 
transmigration official, head of Mobilization and 
Guidance, Eko Sarwoko. Only two months ago the 
findings of a French consult.ant claiming that 80% of 
transmigration sites had failed to improve the stan-
dard of living of transmigrants, were dismissed by 
Minist.P.r of Transmigration, Lieutenant-General Soegi-
arto as too narrow. Sarwoko admitted that the level of 
health in transmigration areas is lower than the 
national level if health is measured by the mortality 
rate. I Suara Km·;i•a 29 May, 1989). 
Despite such damning evidence, the transmigration 
programme blunders on, with 550,000 families to be 
resettled within the next five years. According to a 
report in the Jakarta Post, 4.5 million hectares of land 
will be set aside for residential areas and "support 
projects" to accommodate these families. Djatiyanto, 
director-general for resettlement, assured the press: 
"We need not worry about land area. We still have 
vast areas of land outside Java". (3 June, 1989] 
Colonisation 
During a World Bank funded seminar on transmigra-
tion, Soegiarto denied that Indonesia's transmigration 
programme aimed to "colonize" receiving areas; it was 
better described as "an effort to Indonesianize al1 
islands". [Jakarta Post 20 June, 1989] 
As far as West Papua and East Timar are concerned 
there is not much to choose between "colonization" 
and "Indonesianization"; their peoples reject the 
Indonesian presence in their countries. For tribal 
peoples a.11 over the archipelago whose lands are 
requisitioned for tran~rnigrntion, the prospect of 
Indonesianization is no less attractive. It means 
denying their traditional way of life as hunter-
gatherers or swidden agriculturalists, wearing 
"proper" Indonesian clOthes, abandoning their Iong-
houses in the interior to live in "healthy'' Indonesian-
built houses on easily accessible government resettle-
ment sites. In t.ra.nsmig1•ation areas, the theory is that 
the displaced local peoples will learn better agricul-
tural methods and a "norinal" way Of life from the 
transmigrants' example. 
Speaking at Muko-Muko, the transmjgration site set 
aside for the Kedung Ombo oustees, Suharto denied 
that transmigration displaced "natives" as there was 
enough land in the resettlement areas. He stressed 
that the fear of displacement wlll not necessarily 
occur "if the natives understand the resettlement 
programme and if they see the issue in the Hght of 
national interests". 
Bank predicts ine"t'Mae in lnvoluntar:y :reeettle.ent 
Speaking at a recent seminar on resettleo1ent in 
Jakarta, Deputy Director of the World Bank, v. Raja-
gopalan said that the need for involuntary resettle-
ment will increase by about 50% in the year 2000 due 
to rapid worldwide urbanization. • 
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Who plans the families? 
011 Jt1n~ 8 Prl'i~itl<~nt S11hnrto c:ollecLeJ hiA popu1'llion 
fiWat·d from the UN in Ne\" Yol'k. Secxel1.irv General of 
the UN, Xavier Peres de C'udlnr present.e;i him with a 
medal nnd a cheq\H· for $12,500 for his "strong 
support" to the family pl'ogramme in Indonesia. 
That Suharto should be awarded any prize for 
population is bad enou~h, given the regime's propen-
sity t.o massacre cornm1mist. sympathii::ers, East Timor-
ese, West Pn.puans or 1rny gro11p which opposes it. But 
that il should come from the UN, which does not 
re co~ nii:;e l ndonesiA. 's annexrttion of East Tirnor, is 
f'vcn wors<~. The pr(•dc>rninarit.l:v Catholic Ji:Hst Timorese 
rejcel birth control on religious grounds. Their desire 
to rr>build the popubt.ion rathel' than to limit it is 
understandable, gjven the loss of a t.hird of their 
number at the hands of Suharto's military since 1975. 
Incentives and ooereion 
But it is not only in ·East Timor that birth control is 
imposed lltJon an unwilling population. An ·observation 
of 15 health clinir::s in Jakarta revealed that staff 
"persuaded nnd even half'-forced mothers who have 
not participated in the family planning programme to 
participate immediti.tely, wiL.hont giving any explana-
tion of any sort''. I Report t.o the 5t.h International 
Women and Healt.h Meeting in.,Costa Rica 1987 I 
In a recent Newsivt•ek interview Suharto denied any 
coercion in, Indonesia's family' planning programme. 
Our empliAsis bllS· been on \'olu11t.<Jry fomil.v plann-
ing ... fve h!lve :1 "reimrd syslem '' under which in-
dividwils and co11JJ11unit.v groups get cash and other 
awn.rds by meeting goals of lowered p9pul8Lion rates. 
Rural families who consistently practise famil,v pli:mn-
ing ttre given grnnts anc! technic«tl assisU!nce to 
iricrease their llgricultural oulpllL [Nek'Sweel<, June 
26, 1989]. 
Like the U.SAID, the World Bank, the UN F'lind for 
Populalion Activitfos (which chose Suhn.rto for this 
ye1.1r's award) and other population control agencies 
who finance Indonesia's birt.h control programme, 
Suharto ignores the fact that voluntary participation 
cannot coexist ,,;ithhis "reward system" which leaves 
little genuine choice for \;he desperately poor. Popula-
tkm control in IndonosiR is based. on ta,rgets, where 
officials must register ;i set number of n<?w 'accep-
tors'. "The implement.ntion of the programme does not 
include any consideration for the women who have to 
tnkc all the risks. It only ha.s one goal, to attain the 
target set. by the government". [Women and Health 
Mee ling report quoted nbovi:> l 
The "suc:cess" of fndonesif.l's family planning has 
been achieved, not through more equitable distribu-
tion of food, housin~ and healt,h care - ~hich brings 
down the birth rate of its own l\ccord -but by a top-
down svstem o! tarll:els and incentives. Here "top" 
include~ the complex . of (mos.tly US-domjnated) multi-
lateral development banks, population control agen-
cies, nlf~mbers of the gqvernment BJ!d powerful phar-
mnecut.icnl companies in whose intet·<'st it is that 
population control is undertaken on such a wide scale 
in the third world. [sec Suma.ti Nair, Imperi~Jism and 
the Contl'Ol of Women's Fertilit.v, published by The 
Campaign Against Long-Acting Hormonal Contracep-
tives, London and Amsterdam 1989) 
Suyono Jiaryono, head of the Family Planning Agency, 
with victims of his 'incentives' programme. 
.. Effective .. contraception 
It Is not difficult to understand the relationship 
between population control as a target-based progr-
amme and the type of contraceptive promoted. Con-
doms and th~ pill Cll'e falling out of favour with the 
family planning agency (BKKBN) because the effect 
depends on the decision of the individual, whereas 
IUDs and implants which can only be inserted and 
removed by trained medical staff are considered 
effective. "Effective'' is synonymous with "low user 
control". The Jong-acting hormonal contraceptive 
implant Norplant, lasting five years, is termed an 
"MKE" ( metode konlra.sepsi efektif') along with IUDs 
and sterilization. 
In Padang Pariaman district, West Sumatra, condoms 
and the pill are being phased out. According to the 
local BKKBN head, MKEs will be promoted, as they can 
only be used with the help of doctor, and are "easier 
to supervise".[ Tempo July 1, 1989}. Masri Singarimbun 
at the Centre for Population Research at Gadjah 
Madah University sees the fact that lhe pill is the 
most populnr form of contraception as ll "great 
challenge for the progTamme''. f Koniptis June 5, 1989} 
Side-effects played down 
"Experts" rarely mention disadvantages associated 
wiLh the contraceptives themselves. Possible side-
effects associated with horinonnl contraceptives such 
tu; Norplant - high incidence of menstrual disruptior., 
nausea, headaches, depression - are played down. 
Problems discussed a1·e far more likely to be related 
to liuman failings. Thus the pill · is not effective 
because "most women forg~t to t..'l.ke it before they go 
to bed", says one officinl. [Tempo July 1, 19891 
According to North Jakarta area BKKBN chief, the 
tendency to use the pill and injectable contraception 
(such as Depo-Provera lasting 2-3 months), in prefer-
ence to IUDs, causes problems "because these methods 
require conl..inuit.y and close supervision" which "is 
difficult to apply to people In the lower class because ~ 
they are always movin~ from place to place".[Kompas.,,. 
June 5, 1989) 
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Off . l 1c1a s occasionally admit that there are problems 
?n the ~~KBN side too. There is only 1 family plann-
ing off1c1al. ror about 3.ooo acceptors, many them 
under-qua.hf1cu f Kompas June 5, 1989]. Researcher 
Singarimbnn described ns pressing the drop-out rate 
of over three million in 1986/7 (BKKBN figu1·es). He 
called for improved service nnd i nformation. 
Good grounds to suspect "anti-tetanus" injections 
A recently-arrived refugee from East Timor has 
confirmed thrit there were good grounds for susp-
ecting that "nnll-tetnnus" injections given to 
school-girls in Dili were really injectable contra-
ceptives f see TAPOL B11lletin Nos 92 and 93, April 
and June, 1989]. Whilst acknowledging tha.t neo-
natal anti-tetanus injections could be scientific.ally 
argued, Antonio Araujo, a former health .wot•ker and 
teacher in East Timor, asked: "How can we believe 
this is what the medies were doing? No babies in 
East Timor receive any immunisation for anything, 
so why the sudden precaution about the future 
babies of young girls who are still at school?" 
People believed that the injections were injec-
table contraceptives which would h1we been given 
to the girls on a regular basis · if the programme 
had not been tmlted because of the outcry. Al-
though there is no hard evidence to prove this, the 
suspicion aroused is proof of the widespread 
dlstr11st of birth control mechanisms ln East Timor, 
highlighting the strength of opposition to the In-
donesian-conti·olled birth control pro~ramme in 
Enst Timor. [Interview with Antonio Ar~ujo, June 
19891 
Aid - part. of the conaplr&c7 
The World Bank and other agencies involved in 
population control encourage Indonesia's shift tow-
ards the Int.est in contraceptive technology. USAID 
and the flank have provided loans to enable Indonesia 
to purchase Norplant direct from the mnnufa.cturer nt 
commercial prices. The World Health Organisation has 
lent credibility to Norplant by endorsing it as "suit.11-
ble for use in FAmily Planning programmes" when the 
same report states thnl "there hns been insufficient 
time for large-scale, long term studies ot rare adverse 
effects.'' .{ Nnir p.105] Indonesian women, who repres-
ent three-quarters of Norplant's estimated 200 000 
acceptors (1988 fi~ures) are therefore being used as 
guinea pigs. USAID and World Bank loans translate 
into profits for Norplant, selling at full price a drug 
which is at the trittl stage. 
Caapaian a«alnat Suharto Population Awvd 
In April, TAPOL wrote to Dr Mario Pavn-Palencia 
Chair of the UN Population Award Committee, urgin~ 
it to rescind its decision to give the award to Suhar::_ 
to. "Birth control is an integral part of Indonesian 
strategy to consolidate its annexation of West Papua 
and its unlawful occupation of East Timor." 
How can faith in the UN and ils condemnation of the 
Indonesian occupation of East Timo1· survfre this 
grossl,v insensitfre and ill-considered decision .. ? 
Copies were sent to Peres de Cuellar and Dr Nafis 
Sudik, Director of the UN Population Fund. TAPOL also 
wrote to the World Dank, condemning ils involvement 
in financing population control in Indonesia and 
urging it to withdraw support for the programme. The 
Bank denied that it finances family plnnning East 
Timar, apart from constructing BKKBN buildings, but 
defended the programme in East Timor. Whilst admitt-
ing that "there may have been isolated cases of 
overzealousness on behalf of the family planning 
workers when the programme started" the Dank had 
''been given to believe" this was no longer lhe case, 
after assurances from the Government and the IlKKBN. 
The Bank also cla ims that the Population Project 
does not fjnance the provision of contraceptives, 
omitting to mention that il provided ll lonn for the 
purchase of Norplant.. 
Other opJanisations who protested about the Award 
include the Women's Global Network on Reproductive 
Rights, YWCA Jnp110 1 Federation Internationale des 
Droits de !'Homme, Aclion des Chretiens pour 
!'Abolition d~ Jn Torture, Associ:lUon de Solidarite 
nvec Timor Oricnlo.le, Comile Fran<;:ais pour Jn Defense 
des Droits de !'Homme, Droits de ]'Homme et Solidarite, 
Li~ue du Droit des Femmes, Medec.ins du Monde, 
Pacific /\sin Resource Centre, United Nat.ions Asso-
clalion of Great Uritain, and IMOAS in West Gc1·mnny. 
In a press release issued to coincide with the award 
ceremony, US Congressman Tony Hall said "It is the 
height of iron.v that for the United Nations to give 
Suharto an award for population control when 
Indonesia's "population control" in E'ast Timar 
includes warfare and. disruption of food production. 
The United Nations should be questioning Suharto, 
not giving him an award". I see Indonesian News 
Service July 19, 19891 
Meanwhile the flow of aid conlinues: the Indonesian 
government is currently discussing $20 million 
f\Aslslnnc<~ in grnnt nid from USAID for ,popuJnlion 
control and a grant of $Hi million from the UNFPA 
[J\ompas 25 May, 1989 quoted in Indonesian News 
Service No 188, ,June 30, 1989} * 
Price: ~O pence a copy. 
80 pence for tWo copi<?s 
ond 30 pence I or eoGh 
extra copy, Including 
postog• .. 
Occ11alo11Al lt"ports no. 10 cont.nin" Ure 01•r.n L,etlcr 
lo U1P. World f11111k 1u11l t.hl'l Cull corr.,~pon•lenr." be-
t.we"" T"rol nnd I.hi) Woi'ld fl•rnk 
Conti:i11ed from page 1. 
In further letters to Try Soetrisno on 23 and 30 
June, the Institute submitted names of people ar-
rested in East Timor •. None of the letters has been 
answered, nor have they beefl repot·led in the In-
donesian press. In any case, its chair, HJC Ptinsen is 
a 'banned · person' whose statements may not be 
mentioned by the media. 
Princen has also made available a list of names ·of 
people· executed since March as weJl as a list of 78 
people arrested since April. • 
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Aceh, a special region 
Aceh, the most western tip of the archipelago now 
known as Indonesia and the n6rtherr1 part of Sumatra, 
has always been different. Historically it was thefirst 
point of cont.act for influences from mafoland Asia, 
Hinduism and Buddhism through Indian traders in the 
7th century, and Jsl~m which arrived in thf.l . 13th 
century. In the 16th century, the Porlugties·e, · then 
the Dutch and the English, also landed first in Aceh. 
T.he Acehnei;;e, a fiercely independent and proud 
peqple, ha.ve alwnys fitted .uncomfortably .into the 
Indonesian Republic. Recer1t events suggest that 
tensions there are worsening, causing major problems 
for Jaki'\rta. 
The death of two soldle.rs 
On 30 May First Lieutenant Zakarya, ·45, and Lance-
Corporal M. Gade, 32, wer~ ambµshed in the woods 
n.ear the tiny hamlet., Desn ' N'euheun Meunasnh Pulo 
Siblah, Tiro sub-district, Pidie district, while return-
ing home by motorbike from a meeting. The 'soldiers 
were shot with .a I.ee ·Enfield rifle, then struck with 
a rencdng, ail· Acehnese dagger. Zakarya was com-
mander of the Tiro Koramil, the military sub-district 
command, while M.tjii):ie served as .an NCO. According 
to Seramlfi IndonesiB, a. local newspaper, Gade died 
instantly but Zakarya: survived the initial attack, only 
to be killed by his own pistol which had been grabb-
ed by his uryknown assailant(s), All their 'Weapons 
disappeared. · · 
Reporting in the Indonesian press was minimal. The 
weekly, Editor, published a feature on Aceh, placing 
the attack on the two soldiers in the broader context 
of prese11t-dl'l.y Aceh. No other )fapers reported the 
incident, suggesting that there was· a warning against 
tuiy further mention. · 
Free Aceh Movement 
Tiro is the birthplace of Teuku Hasan di Tiro, who 
set up the National Liberation Front of Aceh/Sumalra, 
known as GAM (Gerakan fl.c~h Merdeka, Free Aceh 
Movementh and proclaimecl Aceh/Sumatra :indepen-
dence in 1976. In the last few years, there has been 
little, news about GA~1, but the shooting of the ' two 
soldiers 'h.<\s again drawn attention to unz'·est in Aceh. 
M.Gade was said by Editor to be known as 'the 
hunter' (origin; English) with a spedal assignment to 
hunt down GAM members; so there was reason enough 
for him 'to be on GAM's hitlist. In April, after a Jong 
se~rch, he , tracked do,'/n Zainuddin Pakeh~ a GAM 
military commander, and killed him ~it.h a single shot 
from his Ml6 s .emi-autorna~k .rifle. This happened in 
Tiro sub-district where AcehHerd~ka was proclaimed 
in 1976 nn·d whieh has 1·emnined one of the strong-
holds of the mot·ernt?i1t. Some leaders Jlke Daud Pti'neuk 
nn<l D~; Zninl have sought osyh1m abroad while 8thers 
were·, captured or ~ave' thelnselves up, like Tengku 
Thay'er Thayeb who is now a fuhctionary of Golkar, 
lhe state pBrty. 
It is difficult to make a proper assessment of the 
strength of the movement: When asked, Acehnese 
shrug their shoulders and reply: "I don't know." The 
strong Muslim identity of the Acehr~ese is often cited 
as being the reason why ·GAM allegedly lacks p()pular-
ity because it is n non-Islamic, nntionaJist .movement. 
However, Acehn'ese have always seen themselves as 
different and are by nature , suspicious of anything 
KALIMANTAN 
from the pusat, the centre, meaning Jakarta. This 
would tend to boost the popularity of GAM. 
A string of. incidents 
Ih April last :tear, angry youngsters attacked the 
Darul Alam Police Station in East Aceh and burnt it 
d9wn, reportedly because officers brought prostitutes 
there. Also in April, the Civil Registration Office in 
Lhokseumawe was attncked by youngsters, accusing 
ofr.iClnls of corruption. · 
The authorities have tried to discredit GAM by 
linking it with the drugs trade but so far these 
efforts have achieved little. Last October, Muchtar bin 
Gadong was found to be carrying 45 kg of ganja on 
his motorbike. At his trial, he was accused of being a 
commander of the 'GAM. 
Hasan di Tiro canrpaigns actively abroad and recent-
ly announced a new anti~S'uharto front. He also claims 
to represent the Woz-Jd Mathaba.li; an organisation 
based in Tripoli struggling against im·perialism, 
racism, zionism and fascism. Mathabah, he says, is 
based · on Islamic principles as well as universal 
solidarity with all genuine liberation movements, 
irrespective of religion, ·race or geography. [ O·Diario, 
24 March 1989). · , 
The tradition or resistance 
The history of Aceh is n long and glorious one. The 
Acehnese sultanate was once the most powerful in the 
region and in the ·16th and 17th centuries was almost .. 
permanently at war with sultans in Malacca and with .,. 
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the Por tuguese. During the r eign of Sult.an Iskan dar 
Muds (1607-1636) , Acch controlle d parts of the main-
la nd including Johor e, Paha ng, Kedah and Perak. It 
was during this p<"riod that a distin~t Acehnese 
culture c ame into being , with s t rong Mnslim values 
becomlng intert wined with Acehnese sod AI s t ructure. 
The Acehnese proudly call Aceh "Sernmbi MekRh ", the 
gateway to Mecca. The Acehnese are a disUnct people , 
influenced by their contact with Arabs, Indians and 
Portuguese. Banda Aceh, the c11.p itnl, is neare r Sin-
gapore, Rangoon, rnom Penh and Colombo than 
J akarta. 
While many parts of the archipe lago were colonised 
by the Dutc h, Aceh rema ined a stmnbling bloc k. In 
1903 lifter 30 years or WA.I", the Dutch riw.naged to 
more or less pacify Aceh bul th P, resistance never 
r eall y dit~ d down. I n 19'1 5-49 wheI) the Dut.c h fought 
lo r e st.ore their rule, Acch was the one place where 
they did not even try. After Indonesian independenc e, 
a11 Muslim-baRC'd rebell ion fought I.he Hepnblic for 
more than a decade and only af.Ler receiving special 
status did the Acehnese agree lo be a province of 
Indonesia. Daud ~eureuh, who died last year, was the , 
leader of the rebellion but both Sukarno and Suharto 
treated him with respect. He was one ,of the very few 
in the archipelago who dt1,red address President 
Suharto as s11rul81:R, meaning .brother, rather than the 
deferential bap:1k. Rulers in .Jakarta are aware of the 
dellcacy of their relalionship with Aceh and have 
avoided i:;t.dct government control as in other prov-
inces. It wns the Jsrnt bast.ion of PPP, formerly n 
Muslim party federation, while the government party 
Golkar always suffered heavy defeats. In 1982 Aceh 
wits the only province to send n majority of non-
Golkar MPs to the national parliament. The PPP won 
convincingly with 58 percent of the votes, while 
Golkl\r rec~lved 37 pcrcl'nL 
Onl y nfl.er lhe PPP woA forced to abandon its Muslim 
character in 1986 and accept the Pancasila state 
ideology did Golkar mnnage to creep forward. The 
1987 elections in Aceh became a matter of honour for 
the Jakarta rulers and all the top brass were sent to 
Aceh to help the Gollcar electoral campaign. Golkar 
campaigning m~nns basically promisin~ the people 
STUDENT ACTIVIST ARRESTED 
Bonar Tigor Naipospos, a stuqent who has been 
sought by the authorities since the arrest of 
Bambang Sudono and Bambang Isti Nugroho last 
June, was arrested in Jakarta in June and taken 
immediately to Jogjakarta to face interrogation for 
alleged involvement in subversive activities. 
In a report about his arrest [Kedaullltan Rakyat, 
21 June 1989], Bonar Tigor is described as an 
active member of a student group in Jogjakarta 
who frequently pla.yed a leading role in discus-
sions. He is also said to have been. responsible for 
the circulation of a number of 'banned' books. The 
report speaks as it the prosecutor has already 
composed his indictment, suggesting that the 
detainee, now being held at Wirogunan Prison, may 
soon be tried. He is said to have received the 
books for circulation from a former tapol, who was 
detained for many years in Buru, named only as 
Kasto. 
The authorities claim that they succeeded in 
tracking down Bonar Tfgor when he participated in 
several of the student actions that have ta.ken 
place in Jakarta. * 
Ibrahim Hassan, 
governor of .Aceh. 
di reel material gains, some times development projec ls, 
presidential aid or departmental special assistance. 
Ibrahim IJassnn, tlic new~y apBointed governor of.Ace~ 
Rnd, a devout Musl.im, managed to convince mnn;r 
Muslims to switc h lo Golkar. Every Fdday, fox- many 
months, Hassan visited mosques to demonstra te his 
concern for the people, giving aft~r-;prayer pep talks 
in favour of Golkar. The Golkar victory in the 1987 
elections was rmi.'rg inal. Of the ten J\cetl . seats, Golkar 
won 5, PPP 4 and the smnl!. PDI 1 .seat. P'PP retained 
its m!ljorily . in Lhe - tht ·ec northern .d i_stricts, Acch 
Besar, Pidie and j\c;eh Utarl\ • .. 
The Golkar victory' in ,Aceh led some Aceh r-ra.tchers 
to drawing l11:i.sty conchisions nbout the rap'id_ pace of 
'I ndonesianisation'. But it seems that Golkar;s ,empty 
election promii es , .i re now causing a bacldaslL One 
important reason for the dissalisfactiO{l is t hat the 
Arun ·natural . '.gas reserves have · 'made, J~karta the 
leading LNG ,.,.,orld exporter. 'I'wq ' huge fertiliser 
p),.:i:~ t$, P~puk Asean and Pl~ puk Iska11,dar Muda, and 
a Kraft paper factory' (partly ow 11<'d l> y Flp b Hasari, 
see page ... ) hnve given ~aknrtn huge rev enues. Aceh 
is also a leading prodqcer of natural rubber, coffee, 
tobacco . anci pepper np<j the ref$ion posse~ses vast 
areas . of tropical rainforest. With · its 4 million people, 
Aceh enjoys .little bcnGfit from development projects 
designed by Jakarta. Jnkarta is takfng plenty and 
g iving little, caushlg nn~<ff n n d frtts t rat.ion amoi1g 
many Acehnese. * 
MURDANI ON CHINA ., 
, Asked for hi's views a.bout China's c,rackdowri on the 
pro-democr[:lcy ' movement and whether this should 
affect Indonesia's de<::ision to re.store diplomatic 
relations with Beijing, General Murdani, Minister of 
Defence, said: "We qon't know. much about what really 
happened there althougb 'some televisic:m viewt:rs in 
Hong Kong saw scenes of demonstrations and shoot-
ings.... Like us. here, we sometimes do things that 
others can't understand." 
As ·he saw .it, demonstrations had been going on for 
a month with no agl'.eement among the leaders on how 
to tac)<le them. In the enq, the armed . . forces $tepped 
in. "Some people co.U this murqe._· but to'r o'ther&, this 
is seen as a matter. of policy~ '' ~·01· 'policy\ Murdani 
used kebijaksanaan, a word which in . In~onesian also 
conveys meaning of 'wl'sdont;. [ M~~deka,)2 July ,1989] 
"We have a very .good, warning system," Murd(lni 
said on ~mother occasior'i, "and we need not commit 
the aJJ"ocities the · PLA did." A~ked . what the govern-
ment would do if confronted b>' chaos, he said the 
arme9 forces .;.,ould declare a ~~te of eme~gencY and b~n all meetings s.nd political :activities. But we· ~ould 
prefer t.9. look for warning signs. "Don't be influenced 
by .what hp.ppened in Beijl~g. That's -not something we 
ever mean to do. 11 [Jakarta Post, 22 July 1989J * 
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Bob Hasan, king of the jungle 
I~ the tropical forests of Indonesia it is not Tarzan who is king but Bob Hasan. Over the yea.rs 
h1s w_ealth and power have steadil,v increased, with the full backing of his long-time patron, 
P1·es1dent Suharto. One cabinet minister said recently: "Bob Hasan is a political institution", 
reason enough to sketch a: profile of.this forestry· tycoon. 
The . non;..nligaa ~t.or 
:When oil prices stnrted to tumble, it became indteas-
rngly difficult for the Suharto government to finance 
its development projects and pay the salaries of its 
huge bureaucracy. Since 1983, it has become crucial 
to boost the non-migas (the non oil and natural gas) 
sector to prevent a dec1ine in state revenue. The 
policy of import-substitutfon/ IISl) had to be aban-
doned in favour of export-oriented industrialisation 
(EOI). The IMF and the World 'Bank have pushed 
Indonesia in this direction to the dismay of more 
nationalistic economists. While EOI means greater 
cooperation with the World Blink and the IMF, more 
nationalistic economists like Hablbie, Indonesian 's 
high-tech tzar!" Soehartoyo and Soehoed, · senior 
industry department -officials, · and Ginandjar Kar-
tasasmita:, · the minister for energy, favour !SI-style 
growth,, folfowing the Japanese model. 
To ' promote· EOI, measures were needed to remove 
obstacles like an inefficient and corrupt customs ser-
vice, and a corrupt and top-heavy bureaucracy. Since 
1984, the Suharto government has been forced by the 
World Bank to proceed with 'de-bureaucratization' 
(abandoning unnecessary . licenses) and deregulation, 
liberalising the economy in order to bqost the non:... 
roigas sector. In the booming seventies, when dil 
prices were high, migas accounted tor 70 per cent of 
exports. Gradually, with government support, . the 
non-migas sector has improved in absolute and 
relative terms. World market prices of nickel and 
copper rose, earning more revenue for the ·state; 
exports of agricultural p.roducts have also risen. But 
the lion's share of non-migas rev.enue has come from 
forestry with exports totalling $ 2.3 billion in 1988. 
The iukina of a kln1 
The one responsible for ~ the upsurge in wood and 
wood product exports is Bob Hasan. He stands astride 
a massive array ot business cartels dealing with 
forest concessions, wood logging, saw mills, wood 
panel manufacturers, furniture industry, rattan 
furniture and handkrarts. This monopoly position can 
only be explained by his long association with · Presi-
dent Suharto. Bob Has~n, born as Thee Kian Seng, an 
Indonesian Chinese, was adopted as a child by Colonel 
Gatot Subtot.O; the first military commander of Central 
Java. In the mid-fifties, Suharto became the third 
commander of the same Diponegor~ Division. Both Bob 
and Suharto look upon Gatot Subroto as their mentor, 
the man who taught them many basic facts of life. 
Gatot groomed Bob HasEin ·to become an entrepreneur 
for the Division. It is a tradition in the Indonesian 
army for commanders take care of their troops with 
handouts to supplement their meagre salary. Hence; 
divisions control business enterprises to earn the 
extra cash, a task usually given to businessmen of 
Chinese descent. 
This was the case with Bob Hasan though he en-
joyed one great advantage: he grew up in military 
circles and was regarded as one ot them. Other 
BobJlti§Wl and acmy chief-of-staff Genel'al Edi Sudl'a.-
J.,t, 1Jl. fl ratllin workshop belonging to the /Jl'm,1~ 
coope1.,·1ti1•e, l'11sl<opnd. /Ja.lwrla f'ost, 12 J11l.Y 1989. 
busi.ness managers of the military have been kept e.t 
arms' length, there only to rake iri the money for the 
military. When Suharto became commander of Diponeg-
oro, Bob Hasan was drawn into a small network of 
officers like Suryo and Sudjono Hmnardani, who later 
emerged as Suharto's inner core. This small group, 
better known as Finek (financial and economic ar-
falrs), was responsible for the extra earnings of the 
command. 
This was when Suharto assigned his Finek to run a 
contraband trade with Singapore, bartering Javanese· 
sugar for rice from Thailand; The operation grew so 
huge that army chief-of-staff; General Nasution, 
decided to step in and punish the culprits. Suharto 
was sacked as divisional commander and Nasution was 
planning to take him to court. But Suharto turned for 
support to General Go.tot Subroto, by then army 
deputy chief-of-'staft. Instead of being dishonourably 
dismissed from the army, Suharto was 'sent back to 
school' in Bandung, the army staff and command 
school. He continued his military career while Bob 
Hasan moved to Jakarta to manage Suharto's business 
interests. 
In his autobiography, Suharto makes no attempt to 
conceal his smuggling, giving the story a twist to 
justify the operation: 
As war administrator, I felt I had the authority to 
take an emergency decision to barter sugar for rice, 
in the interests of the people. I sent Bob Hasan to 
Singapore to arrange this barter, insisting that only j 
after the rice had arrived in Semarang should the 
sugar be delivered. I was afraid that if the sugar was 
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delivered first and the rice failed to arrive, I could 
be blamed, even hanged. Later, there were reper-
cussions. While on an SSKAD course, I was accused of 
being a large-scale corruptor who was enriching 
myself from the proceeds of bartering sugar. (Autobi-
ography, page 85). 
When Suharto became Mandala commander, leading 
the West New Guinea and later the Malaysia campaigns, 
Bob Hasan benefitted enormously and laid the first 
cornerstone of his business empire. When Suharto 
became president, Bob Hasan was assigned to take 
care of their respective family fortunes, with Suhar-
to's eldest son, Stgit Haryoyudanto, becoming Hasan's 
business partner in companies like P.T. Nusamba 
which manufactures tinplate, a company involved in 
off-shore drilling aqd a car assembly plant. Bob Hasan 
also became Indonesia's major shipping tycoon but it 
was timber that was to become his major asset. 
Bob Ba.san'a aonopoly 
Next to Brazil, Indonesia has the second largest 
tropical forest area, meaning that the economic 
potential of Indonesian forestry is enqrmous. ·After 
the switch to EOI, Bob Hasan gradually became the 
main actor in the forestry business. He now chairs all 
the organis~tions involv~d with forestrY - MPI, the 
Indonesian Forestry Community, ·APKIN DO, the In-
donesian Plywood/Woodpanel Association, ASMINDO, 
the Indonesian Furniture and Handicraft Association, 
ISA, the Indonesian Sawmillers and Wood Product 
Manufacturers Association and APHI, the Indonesian 
Loggers Association. On top of this, he chairs two 
sports associations, positions normally reserved for 
generals. As Bob Hasan is a mere civilian, this shows 
just how powerful he is. 
His chairmanship of APKINDO is the best example of 
his global power. lndonesia with its huge quantity of 
wood has become the largest plywood producer in the 
world with 70" of the world market. APKINDO can best 
be described as a carte] Uke OPEC and, considering 
its huge share of the world market, can dictate prices 
by controlling the stock. Due to the ban on log 
exports in 1980, many logging companies (mostly saw 
mills) were forced, in accordance with government 
plans, to move into downstream industries like ply-
wood manufacturing, chipboard, mouldings and 
furniture. At present APKINDO has 108 members, the 
exact number of plywood mills. They are divided into 
seven JMBs (Joint marketing boards) with Bob Hasan 
setting the quota for each JMB, which is then sub-
divided between the individual plywood manufac-
turers. Thanks to its monopolistic position, Apkindo 
can set export prices and is solely empowered to 
issue export licenses to plywood manufacturers. 
Companies who violate APKINDO's rules are heavily 
penalised and some mills have even had their licences 
suspended. According to APKINDO figures, plywood 
output and exports have steadily grown: 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
Production 
m3 million 
2.94 
3.82 
4.98 
5.32 
6.75 
Exports Exports 
m3 million t billion 
2.02 
3.02 
3.78 
4.62 
5.95 
6,89 
0.48 
0.66 
0.81 
1.10 
1.89 
2.31 
Source : APKINDO in FEER, 6 April 1989 
Japan is the major importer of plywood with a value 
of $584 million, followed by the US and Canada with 
$378 million and China with $339 million. Next comes 
continental Europe with S199 and Britain and Eire 
with a value of $123 million ( 1988 figures). 
Bob Hasan's power can also be gauged from the 
battle he waged with Japanese plywood manufacturers 
regarding the high tariff of 15% Japan imposed on 
plywood imports from Indonesia. Hasan aggressively 
dumped huge quantltles of plywood on the Japanese 
market and late last .year, APKINDO established its 
own trading houses in Tokyo and Osaka. At present, 
everything seems to be gotng Bob Hasan's and In-
donesia's way, with Hasan hoping to extend the 
practice to rattan furniture (the export of unprocess-
ed rattan is now banned) where Indonesia supplies SO 
per cent of the world's needs. Similarly he has 
targeted sawn timber for the APKINDO system al-
though Indonesia only controls 30 per cent of the 
world trade. 
The oent:reHaatlon of power 
It is striking that a man with such ambitions should 
run his many enterprises in such a dicta~rial and 
heavy handed way. Although big and thriving, APKIN-
DO has a "management system akin to a sidewalk 
vendor", said a top forestry ministry official. "Haaan 
accepts no consultation. He thinks he is doing the 
right thing, but he ia one man, he can make mis-
takes". [FEER, 6. April 1989}. . Jndeed the heavy 
handed APKINDO system is already showing flaws and 
weaknesses; there are widespread under-the-counter 
discounts to traders in Singapore and Hongkong, 
ex:porters of high quality timber are being forced to 
downgrade production in order to meet the quota of 
low-grade plywood, and above all, there is gross 
neglect of reforestation, although fees are collected 
for the purpose. 
Most serious is the fact that a single person holds 
such a decisive . sway over Indonesia•s tropical for-
ests. While concern over forest destruction is a major 
global issue, Bob Hasan regards rainforests as a 
commodity, As long as Suharto is in power Bob Hasan 
is relatively secure and beyond criticism. But like 
Ibnu Sutowo, head of the state oil company Pertamina 
who came a cropper in the mid-seventies, Bob Hasan 
could also stumble at the peak of .his power. As 
chairman of MPI, the Indonesian Forestry Community, 
he is hitting hard at the growing conservationist 
movement. His ~i~ple message is: forests ~hould be 
exploited for the welfare of so9iety and timber exports 
should b.e a major foreign exchange earner. In a 
lecture Ha~an portrayed conservationists as "a move-
ment , supported and financed by our competitors, 
because they feel threatened by our expanding 
exwrts''. [ Berita Hy tan, no 16, Jan1.1ary, February 
1989] 
Along with growing pressure in Indonesla, •interna-
tional pressure must be stepped up to save Indones-
ia's rain,foJ;'ests from men like Hasan. • 
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Taking on. the conservationists 
Indonesia ·, and . Malaysia hnve a.greed to fight the 
"negative campaign'' launchE?d by· conservationist 
groups against the · import ·or tropical timber irlto 
Europe. The 'European Parliament' adopted a resolution 
calling . foi; 8. gradual ban 'on thh impoi"t of tropical 
hardwood in 'May this ye'ar, 'after lobbying from 
Friends of the Ea1'th's Rainfo1;est Campaign. 
~tistnkenly attri'bltting the campaign to Greenpeace, 
Forestiy Minister Hasjrul ·Hara.hap said they know 
nothing about forestry in Iridoriesia. Bob Hasan [see 
separate article l; head bf just about everything in the 
Indonesia:n forestry business, has declared that the 
"conservationist. grotlps" are ·· a front for competing 
businesses ,.(ho want to see· the d·ecllne of timber 
imports from Inddriesia; ··· · 
At. Limes likefhese, the gOver•nrneht counters foreign 
criticism by citing lts forestry regulations - the ~ban 
orr the export of ra:w logs 'in force since 1985', the 
Selective Cutting system which 'ls supposed to ensure 
forest regeneration; the levy po.id by timber conces..; 
sionaires tO fhmnce reforestation and the development 
of liinber estates. But t.hMr:v is rather different from 
practice. Timber cM1cessionaires often ;' operate in 
renl'ote areas, 1.frishnckled by governinent i•egulations 
and mariy do not implement selective C\1t1iing or wait 
the required ·35 yea1;s before they start ldgging again. 
' Reforestation so ftfr h:~s also been li debacle and lne 
J.lem,bers of the forest consen:a~io11 organi-
sation. Skephi, out,~ide Pal'liame·nt. Their 
banne1· reads: 'Destruction of tropical 
forests is not an illusion.' .. 
small amount of reforestation that has been carried 
out has been a dismal failure: timber estates ' planted 
on a monbcultural basis are Infested wlth disease and 
else"' here ' seedlings perish through lack of care. 
International ce.apaign . 
The gravity of the situation prompted the Asia-Plicitic 
Peoples' Environment Network tP launch an interna-
tional campaign to save Indonesia's tropical forests. 
A report by APPEN Cites an article in Editor {Julv 2, 
,1988) which puts 'annual deforestation at 900;000 
hectares and holds "rapacious logging practices, 
t1·anr::mlgration programmes, jungle clez!.rance to plf#.nt 
rubber, cocoa and palm oil, gold mining operations 
and foreign e'xpioitatiori" and fires responsible. 
According to Hfra Jh~mtani in 'the Jakarta Post (23 
June 19891 the only wa.y to sustafri. tropical wood "is 
the development of the political wj]J to ' ·solve the 
problem,<;, ~ow arid in the ~uture/' Far from showing 
any such political will, the Indonesian arid Malaysian 
forestry rri'inisters now plan a campaign thmugh lhe 
tna.ss 'media in ASEAN' countries to convince people 
that the principles of exploitation conservation ai·e 
being applf~d. In this way, he said, even a taxi-driver 
who cornes across a forelg.ner "posing as a. to1frist but 
really investigating forest destrtict.ion" ·wl1l know 
whal lo say. f See Su.<iz'a Karya, 28 June 1989]. . • 
Te.r,rorised for a golf-course 
Farmers who ~reaiS:~~d being thi;own 9ff )their land to 
make way for 'a , golf co,urse have, been intimidated by 
armed officials because they refus~d · to accept Rp 
30/m2 compens!J,tfon. Shots were. f1red, injuring two 
farmers. They were the!( strung' up by ,~_their belts, 
beaten repeatedly and hurned with Cigarettes. [Les-
tari Alamku, July 21, 1~69], (Lestari AJamku, Nature 
Conservation, replac;:,es , Berita Hutan; . News of the 
Forest, which was banned earlier this year. l 
The dispute a.rose when head of Cima.can village in 
Pa.cet sub-district. near ; Cibodas National ~a.rk in 
West Java, .rented out land which ,had been worke<f by 
the f~rmers for decades, to real-estate company PT 
Bandung Asri Mulya. · 
Coordi~ating Ministe~ f0,t Security and P01itjcal 
Affairs Admiral Sudomo, President of the Indonesian 
Golf Union, . aaJd uie land . t:ransfer did .not break any 
Jaw, )Jut · Kompas [July . 25) reported that Interior 
Ministl'lt: General Rudini l~rdered work on the golf 
course to stop until ,the dispute .had been resolved .• 
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Student protestors roughed up 
Although the present wave of student protests has 
been relatively peaceful, some nasty incidents oc-
curred when the police decided to step in. In Ja.k.arta 
and Bandung, it was the police who used brute force, 
a new phenomenon in Indonesia. In tbe past, the 
military have usually dealt with student unrest, b~t 
since the notorious Kopkamtib, the state · s·ecurity 
body consisting of Laksusda, the regional :military 
units, was disbanded, the police force has had more. 
responsibility for law and order. Though .new to the ·· 
job, the police are learning fast; the bloody incidents 
in Jakarta and Bandung show that the police cap be 
just as brutal as the army. 
The bloody ~n&7&1l incident 
On 8 1989 an estimated 75 students from 16 univer-
sities and academies launched the third ph~se of .their 
campaign to protest against the 25 per cent rise in 
electricity prices announced by the g~verri,ment in 
April. Calling themselves the Students · Committee to 
Lower Electricity Ta.riffs, the students ·carried baq,-
ners s~Ying 'Development for whom?' and 'Yet again 
the commoh people are the ~ictims'. Before arriving at 
the Parliament building, the police stopped the march, 
insisting that ~he students taJte a police tr\lG~ which 
they had laid · on for tii.e t?tudents.. .The stuqents 
refused, as a .march wouW, draw more 'public ~ttention; 
Uniformed and plain-clot~ed policemen far . outnum-
bered the protesting students. After two hours 
discussion without reaching agreement,. _the. police 
started using force. Students were violent}:Y ·. kicked 
and p1.u1ched and were grabbed and thrown into the 
trucks. Practically all the demol)strators were taken 
intQ custody at the ;city's main police station. .·. 
The same evening about 8. hundred st.udents demon-
strated for the release of their colleagues, but two of 
the demonstrators were arrested and dragged into t.he 
police-station by plain"."clothed policemen, and accused 
of clrculati~g a pamphlet called: Bloody $enayan, 8 
June 1989. The 77 detainees were intensively inter-
rogated; some were malt,J:e~ted and beaten up. . . 
The next day, 63 were released, one by one, but 
police spokesman, Major Djoko Santoso said .that 14 
would be held for further interrogation. Some of the 
released students approached the. Legal Aid Instit:ute, 
LBH, in order to sue the police for holding student.s 
for more than 24 hours , without warrant, in violation 
of the criminal procedures code. , 61 or tho~e r ,E;!leased 
had been held for between 26 and 32 hours~. Moreover 
the families of the . 14 still detained, . received, n<;> 
warrants as they had bee.n hand~d personally to; the 
14. After ten days of interrogation, 12 were released; 
two days later the remaining two, Nuku Sulaiman and 
Primus Interpares Wawo, were also released. All were 
required to sign a document promising not ' to sue the 
police. 
Police spokesman Lt.Col. A. Latief Rabar has since 
announced that the 14 students will be tried for "dis-
rupting public order" and "inciting public disobed-
ience to the government's electricity tariff polic:v''. 
The 12 April Merdelca incident 
On 12 April, students in Bandung organised in the 
Badsn Koordihasi Mahasiswa Se-Bandung (Bandung 
Student Coordinating Body), marched to the city hall 
to meet the mayor, their third action in the Kacapir-
ing case, a land ev-iCtion case in the West Java capital. 
One . of the cilrliel' ~Uidetit pFolests 11gainst ,'tf1e elec-
tricit,;, price incre«1ses1 wl7ich passed off pe{lcef41lx. 
T.his time, the n1a,y6,r refused to meet whqle group and 
insisted on receiving only . a delegation. When the 
students refused, tl.1e s~tuation ~eq11me tense, due also 
to the presence of plain:•:clothed p9Jjcemen. 
The students decided to . make . theii: protest br 
unfurling J:>anners acroi;i,s the street, Ja,l~n Me~.deka. 
virtually blocldng off traffic. Jn l\O. time th~ place wa,.s 
full of anti-r.icit squads, tpe mobile brigade and plain-
clothed intelligence ;.vho started . hit.Ung a~ .. the stu-
dents. The student$ scattered. They :were chased and 
ch1b.bed 'on the }lead with batons; many sustained 
broken arms, were bitten .by police-dogs or ,overcome 
by tear gas. ''.rw~ntY-,-sev~n wer~ badly injured, of 
who:rq~ l~ ~ere concu,ssep . . · . . · . . .. 
There wer.e 36 arrests, 33 students e..nd 3 Kac~P.iJ:iqg 
tenants.On.the same ~vening, a crpwd ;of about 3,000 
students marched to the police, heaciquart~rs. opposite 
the c:;ity ha.ll. About 30P metres. '1WaY 1 the, huge gath-
ering mass was confronted by ,an, a~ti-J:ipt sq1,1a,d~ The, 
students demanded that the S,Uiwangi (West . Java 
divisi~~ l military commande.r release all the detainee.a, 
apologise for t~w everits earlier, tl:iat day,. pay damages 
and PaY for medical treatment for the s.tudents. ; 
The stu.deJ:ltS remained on .the streets until 9 . pm, 
taking the ·opportuni~y to open their fast together, as 
It was Rt}.madhan~ The authorities pr.0D1i,,,~d to r,f1l~~~e 
th~ . students the next morning. All but five, from the 
Bandung lnsti~u,tft for Technology, were rel~ai;ied .·a·s 
promised. T~e .other five were relira.s.~cf.:lrit~r. 
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West Papuan flag-raisers on trial 
The trial of Dr. T~m Wainggai and his Japanese wi.fe, 
Teruko, both arrested at the 14th December 1988 flag-
raising incident in Jayapura, began in April. The 
Wainggais, their daugh~er and many others, were 
be~ten up and a.treated by Ind,onestan troops after a 
crowd of 7'0-100 Papuans took down the Indonesian 
flag and hoi.r:>ted the West . Papuan flag in Jayapura 
last December [see TAPOL Bulletin Nos. 92 &, 93] .. 
About 2,000 people, most of them students, tried to 
attend the public sessic>ns. At the third session on 
May 29, the . fifty who were allowed in . to watch the 
proceedings, were accompanjed by seventy intcl-
li~ence personnel. The others stayed outside the 
court and asked for the trial to be relayed to them 
through a lmld speaker. After several public sessions, 
the governillent. decided t.o avoid the e.vident po:Pula~ 
support for the prisoners by moving the court, 
without prior notice, to El. military area. It is not 
known whether the prisoners have lawyers to assist 
them in the.fr defence. There has been no report of 
the trial in the Indonesfon press. 
Women abused 
On June 1, the couple was transferred, along with 35 
other detainees, trom Abepura Prison to a military 
prison near .Waena, between Abepura and Sentani. 
Visits from family and friends are forbidden. 'fhere 
arc no facilities at the prison for the four women 
detainees, all four of whom have reportedly been 
abused. 
Mrs Wainggai, who speaks little Indonesian, was not 
provided with an interpreter at her trial. She spoke 
Japanese throughout and her husband translated for 
her. Nothing is known about the charges and neither 
the flag-raising incident itself nor the trials have 
been reported in the Indonesian press. 
Pastol'S detained 
Among the 37 still detained are seven pastors, 
including four from the Pentecostal Church. The 
seven pastors are Melkianus Numberi, Marthinus 
Marani, Amina.dap Oropa, Alex Wamea, Ones Waromi, 
Robbi S. Fonataba and Luther Karubara. 
On the 28th May, the Wainggat family met for a 
Sunday service in Abepura Prison chapel. This was 
the first time the family had been together , since 
December 14th. A few days later Dr and Mrs Wainggai 
were moved and are now out of reach of their family. 
The level of oppression in West Papua makes it 
impossible for people connected with the church to 
give the Wainggais and the other detainees any assis-
tance or protection. It is to be hoped that there will 
be a call for an international investigation and that 
the International Red Cross which is now allowed to 
work in Irian Jaya will be able to visit the detainees •• 
Scott Paper campaign grows 
Scott Paper is facing continuing presE:ure to withdraw 
from its proposed $653 mil1i9n investment in a timber 
estate/pulp mill project in Merauke, West J;>apua. 
Bombarded by letters of protest from a.round the 
world, S~olt bns composed a standard letter ad-
dl'essed "Dear Scott c~msumer" in which the US paper 
giant tries to placate' prote'stors, assuring them thnt 
only after "thorough environmental and sociological 
studies, conducted by an independent consultant" will 
the project proceed. But Scott still has not promised 
to withdraw if local people oppose the project. 
And there is good reason to oppose it. Scott claims 
that only about 160,000 ha. will be planted over a 16-
year period and that most of the 850,000 ha. conces-
sion will be left in its natural state "to provide for 
the protection of the wetlands, buffers around 
villages, consl.deration of sacred grounds of the local 
people a.nd other . environmental and sociological 
needs." The fact is, there isn't likely to be a.n.v land 
in Scott's concession not owned by the indigenous 
Auyu tribal groups. Al1 the land is owned and utilised 
in some way by this hunter-gatherer people and 
according to traditional law, ownership cannot be 
bought or sold. Scott's assurance that "sacred 
grounds" ' will be considered and that "those people 
who wish to continue their hunting and gathering 
ways cnn do so" is a token gesture; any land taken 
by the project will be land on which people depend. 
Scott has set up its base camp near Bade on the ll.. 
Digul River. According to the company, a test tree,, 
West Papua: The 
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farm of eucalyptus (nbout 60 ha.) is being developed 
as part of the impact study. 
Australia gets in on the act 
In true multinational style, Scott. will not rely on 
Indonesia to provide all the project's needs. It looks 
as if Darwin has been chosen as the supply base to 
provide various technical needs for the project and 
social needs for its employees. This is a slight to the 
Indonesians who view the Scott project as part of its 
Irian Jaya Integrated Development Programme. Scott 
has said the project could "help bring schools and 
modern medical facilities" to local people - but evi-
dently, if the company intends to build a hospital in 
Darwin, "modern medical facilities" provided for local 
people will not be good enough for Scott's staff. The 
project will follow the familiar multinational pattern 
where employees and their families are cushioned from 
the realities of the third world by building a "first 
world" refuge. The two worlds have little contact. 
Indoneai4's great white hope 
Scott's $653 million investment is the laqtest single 
foreign investment in Indonesia's industrial develop-
ment to date. The paper and pulp industry is a 
development priority to boost the non-oil and gas 
sector. Over the next fifteen years, 57 new pulp 
projects are planned. Timber estates ( 1.5 million ha. 
over the next five years) wfll provide the timber to 
feed the mills. 
This is bad good news for natural fo1·ests, the home 
and resource base for tribal groups and haven ~or 
countless species of 1rnima.ls and plants. Fnst-growmg 
species planted in timber estates - eucalyptus, pine, 
acacia - may feed the pulp mills morP. efficie11tly but 
bio-diversity will be lost and. the rights of tribal 
people violated~ 
Dioxins 
One renson Scott has decided to invest in Indonesia 
is that it will be able to transfer technology whic~ is 
less acceptll.ble in the US and Canada. Kraft pulp mills 
- the type that Scott plans for Me1·auke - are the 
focus of environmental campaigners because the 
chlorine bleaching process used produces highly 
dangerous dioxins. These are then released as ef-
fluent into thP. environment and traces have been 
found in the paper products themselves. 
Health and safety violations in North Ame'°lca 
Scott's far from spotless reputation in North America 
does not bode well for West Papua, where regulations 
are less stringent and enforcement unheard of until 
recently. Scott recently paid a $450,000 fir1e to settle 
charges involving over 150 health and safety viola-
tions at its plant in Winslow, Maine. In Nova Scotia the 
practice of using herbicides. containing dioxin to 
eliminate native species has Jed to a boycott of its 
products and els~where in Canada where Scott has 
large plantations, a study of pulp and paper workers, 
showed a heavy accumulation of PCB, a chemical used 
to used to make timber termite-proof. [ Tt'orld Rsin-:-
forest Report March-May, 1989) • 
~GI - I 
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More Western aid pours in 
The 32nd meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Indonesia (IGGI) in Jt1ne 1 provided 7 per cent more 
aid than last year, a total of $4 ,297 .5 billion. The 
meeting in The Hague was attended by the 14 donor 
countries, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, UK, USA, Austria and Spain, with 4 
multinational agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the 
Asian Development Bank and the UNDP. The Scan-
dinavian countries also attended a.s obaerver nations. 
The donor countries reduced their combined share 
by 2 per cent while the multinationals increased 
theirs by 17.8 per cent. As in 1988, Japan contributed 
the lion's share of bilateral aid with $1,460 million, 
followed by France $139,3 million, the UK $9613 million 
and the USA $90 million. The World Bank committed 
$1,350 million (last year, $1 1200 million) and the ADB, 
$700 million ($550 million}. As in 1988, besides program 
and project aid, most aid was given as 'special 
assistance', which can be used to finance budgetary 
deficits or help reduce balance of payment deficits. 
Special assistance which amounted to $2.4 billion last 
year, fell to $1,85 billion and will gradually be phased 
out by 1992. 
The 1989 World Bank annual report still reflects 
confidence in the Indonesian economy though it is 
more harshly critical than before. In particular more 
fundamental changes in the legal system and an 
overhaul of the civil service is needed to achieve the 
economic reforms needed, the Bank says, Echoing 
complaints from aid donors and foreign investors, the 
World Bank report lamented the level of corruption in 
the civil service, largely due to meagre salaries. The 
report also rebuked the public sector, the state com-
panies in manufacturing, trading, banks and public 
'How much more foi.:eign debt ca11 .You carr.v?' 
utilities, for being inefficient and corrupt. Refor 
and privatisation can ease the burden of the sta .. e 
budget and should be implemel},ted soon. 
The IMF report was concerned that Indonesia's e>ut-:-
standing foreign debt increased by $19 billion to 
about $50 billio11 1985 to 1988, due mainly to the 
dollar's depreciation agail}st other major currencies, 
in pa1·ticular the Japanese yen· and the German mark. 
It is estimated that 80 per cent of the increase was 
caused by the dollar depreciation. Indonesia's debt 
service has gone up to around $6.9 billion, • 
26 TAPOL Bulletin No. 94, August 1989 
BOOK REVIEW 
-~---- ~-~· -· 
Suharto, Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya, (Suhar-
to: My Thoughts, Sayings and Deeds), An Autobio-
graphy as told to G. Dwfoayana and Ramadhan K.H., 
published by PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta, f 989, 599 pp. . 
wt;~'n thii;i b~k fai),~d ,to appear. last D~cember, it was 
PU_t . ~h9,t_1 ,t thl,\t the draft, wb\ch , had, been given 
li~ited cfrculo.tion, so angered '.close associates that 
Suhar!A> . was under pressure to revise certain .pas-
sages •.. As i_t turns out, the fJqa.) ver~ion .of the .. book 
which was 1;19blished in April incorporated none of the 
expected ,changes. · · 
This tell!? us a lot about Suharto's view of his hold 
on power. Rightly ,or w.rongly, .he .considers that his 
grip on pow~r is sqJid enough "ror him i;:iot to care a 
d~mn !,lhoL1t upsetting an~one. It sugge'.sta, that .he no 
Icmger fee_ls the need to relY, on t}l,e undivided l~yalty 
of th.e_ armed forces. No-one doubts that anti:._ Suharto 
rumblings ln the upper echelons of the armed forces. 
have been growing. But nor is it doubted that Suhar-
to h~~· }!!119e. 1983, be~n building .11ew _structures -
Golkar, his State Secretariat, and last but not least, 
his family empire - convinced that these will see him 
through the next presidential election in 1993. Wheth-
er b.i~ c~:mfjqgns,:f! is warr_{lnted oqly time can tell, but 
there is re.ason to believe this is' what he thinks. 
Does he mean whathe says about perhaps standing 
•down at the next. presidential ele,ctfon in .1993? Hardly, 
for he portrays all presjdential elections since 1965 as 
being a question .of . duty being thrust upon him. 
Perish the thought .th~t anyone should . say . he ever 
. promQt~d · his own cp.ndiqaFY· 
Suharto. the Sul~ . , . , 
For years now, Suha1·"to h~~ behaved like a sultan. He 
is surrou,nded by defe:re~tial bureaucrats, siiiurndned 
to do his <bidding, anxious to be the ones to convey to 
an ca,ger publicc: the words of wisdom passed down 
from on high about affairs of state. It shbuld not 
come as a shock to read, in this autobiography, page 
after page of sh.ameless, unr.~lieved obsession with his 
own sayings and deeds, the numerous claims he makes 
of single-handepj:i_r .,st,e~ring ry]s regime ~isely and 
correctly on all major issues for nearly a quarter of 
a century. Two of :h!s closest 'e.ssoc~ates, now dead, 
Generals . Ali J1urtopo and Sudjqno Humardani, are 
treated with undisguise~ contempt, hardly the way to 
inspire present.:..day Suharto loyali~ts. . · -· · 
An Indonesian .,has. qbserved: "If you . consider 
Suharto's own psych,ologi~al make-up, it.would appear 
that he would like , to be Pr~sldent for life. He has 
already constructed a family mausoleum... This is a 
Javanese, form of communication. He would like to die 
as president and he would like to have a state funer-
al. How else cah he compete with the funerals of 
Javanese sultans?" [Inside IndonesiS:, April 1989 p 18. 
Some revieweri; see the autobiography as proof that 
Suharto has lost his political touch, that a man known 
for his 'graciousness' who exudes a 'sense of inner 
calm and contentment' has now brou·ght into question 
much of the received wisdom about him ' and his 
presidency. lDavid Jenkins in Sxdnex Morning Herald, 
4 July 19891 ' ' . 
Suharto's account of 1 October 1965 
The problem with calls to re-assess Suharto is that 
few commentators have ever acknowledged the devi-
ousness and brutalitr with which he seized power in 
1965. The chapter devoted to 1 October 1965 · shows 
him to be cool and collected; coping unfalteringly with 
events which, we are expected to believe, he knew 
nothing about in advance. · 
Everything Suharto records a.bout his actions on 
that day confirms that he was prepared for what was 
about to happen. How could he, having just heard 
that several ·· generals had been kidha.pped, calmly 
drive himself at the crack of dawn, without escort, 
through the streets of Jakarta to his headquarters at 
the Strategic Army Reserve which, miraculously, had 
not been occupied by rebel troops? How was he so 
sure he was not a target. and that the kidnap gangs 
were not still roaming the · streets? This chapter 
provides much evidence that Suharto was prepared 
for everything on that day. It should be closely 
examined for leads about Suharto's own involvement 
in the kidnap and murder of six members of the army 
general staff. 
Suharto. by Suharto 
Many commentators have be~m -shocked by the breath-
taking .arrqgance of. a . ~an still in. power setting .out 
to tell his own life story. But herein Iles pernaps the 
most important clue to this work. Many events in his 
life could, .if prope,rly examined, say volumes .about 
the ambitions of power which. this supposedly self-
effacing, modest JaV;'anese has pursued wi~h single-
:tninded deterJJlination for many years. Many events, if 
properly examined, would tear aside. th,e deceptions 
that have helped Suharto avoid thorough examination 
of his past and · prese~t. ' · ·. 
What was his role in the 26 July 1946 affair when 
associates of the radical politician, Tan Maiaka, made 
an abortive attempt to oust the government of Sjah-
rir? [Ghapter 71 What was he doing, having a clandes-
tine meeting with the Commtuiist' Party (PKI) leader, 
Muso, only days before the Jeftwing movement was 
crushed by troops under Colonel (now retired gene-
ral) Nasution? {Chapter 91 ,What was his relationship 
with the {>KI, rapidly becoming · the major poiitical 
force in Central Java, when he occupied the position 
ot Central Java military commander in the 1950s? 
(Chapter 15J Why does he allege that he knew tor 
certain that the 1 October 1965 affair was organised 
by to~ PKI as soon as he heard that Lieutenant-
Coloriel Untung, asubordinate of his for .many years, .. 
was in charge? [Chapter 18J These are sensitive., 
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questions for Suharto to which he must give his own 
answers, in the hope that Indonesian analvsts and 
historians will continue to avoid seeking the truth 
about the man who has had the Indonesian . state in 
his grip for nearly 25 years. Ha'V'ing given his own 
version of these events, other versions ' become 
subversive. Suharto has· a great deal to hide about 
his past and he trusts only himself to tell .his story 
in the way he wants history to record it. 
Suharto and the death squads 
The most controversial chapter, the one which Suhar-
to was under the greatest pressure to amend. is 
Chapter 69 where he confirms tha.t "there was nothing 
mysterious at all" about the killing of thousands .of 
alleged criminals in 1983-84. "We needed to have our 
own treatment by means of violence. Those who 
resisted had to b~ shot. Then some . of the corpses 
were left lying · around, just like that, This was for 
the purpose of shock trt;ia.tment." .Western <govern-
ments. keen to justify their continuing supp()rt for 
this confessed mass murderer, have gone to great 
lengths to prove that this does not really mean what 
it appears to mean. LS~e box} 
But what do the armed forces, held responsible for 
the death-squads, . mak~ of this . embarrassins . confes-
sion? They were the ones who insisted on calling 
their killers 'mysterious', More specific~lly, . what does 
General Murdani lllake ot ' it, th~ o~~ who as armed 
forces comm~nder-in;-cchief and · chief of ,Kopkamtib, 
told an unbelieving world at the time that corpses left 
lying f:lround ~ere the ,v;ictims of 8i+ng wad.are? When 
the a,utobiography came out, Murda11i tOld a Dutch 
journalist: "I had to lie and lie and now he writes 
this.'' [NRC Handelsblad, 9 ~arch 19S9JNo\f1 however, 
he treads mo1·e carefullv, 
Asked by a member dr parlia,rnent to explain these 
glaring contradictions, Mui:;gani saiq they were not 
contradictory at. all. "Those mysterious . crack-shot 
teams were crea.ted . by ,Pangkopkamtib·· (ie. himself) to 
reduce crime." The .problem was, he saJd, .. tbat the 
police were unable , to cope, "We acted. firl)lly, in tha,t 
if' (the criminal) resisted, I ge.ve my men perlllission to 
shoot." Yet, he stUl .. insists tha,t the corpses lying 
around were the victims of inter-gang wal'fare which 
flared up as the result of growing pressure on .the 
Two Indonesian passers-b.Y fine/:, tJ,e p.i:.~te$te1·s' 
banners hal·d to t3ke. Demonstrators from Survival 
International, TAPOL 8nd other organisstions kept 
vigil. outside the Commonwealth. 111stitute in .Lon(ion 
dui·ing the govel'nment .... sponsoz·ed Asl!lat f:!Xhibition on 
2 June 1989. 
gnngs to poach on each other's territory. {Suara 
Pembaz•uan. 12 July 1989 I 
Murdani has now confirmed that the 'mysterious' 
killers were acting on his .orders . . His remarks also 
show that he, for. one, whose words still wield great 
authority in . the armed forces, has no intention at 
present of contra.dieting Suharto's words. This would 
confirm that Suharto's attitude <>f not giving a dti.mn 
about what others think is well founded .. · For the time 
being at lea.st,< publication of the autobiography 
appears not t.o have shaken his chances of remaining 
in power into the foreseeable future. * 
C8l'mel Budia.z-djo 
FOREIGN OFFICE COMES TO 
SUHARTO'S DEFENCE 
The following letter, dated 26 . June 1989, was 
received by Lord Avebury, chair of the Parlia,!Jlen-
tary Human Rights Group and TAPOL's Honol.·ary 
President, from Lord Trefga.rne, .Minister of State 
at the Foreign Office: 
Thank yoll .(oJ.' .. ;:<JUJ'.letteJ" of J~ . May. ft:e /lal:>.e /lq 
argument with the translation enclosed with your 
letter. As I stated fa 11ly wdtten answer, Suharto's 
autobiography 'Beeks to Justify th<! killings. I am 
a.lso awal'e · of ·. repeated allegations that these 
killings were carded out by the Indonesian armv. 
Bu.t I do not accept th8t. the sentence yoU cite, "We 
had to have oti1· own treatment" is sufficient to 
justify an uneqµivocal statement that President 
Suharto had admitted that the killings had been 
committed by persons acting under the ot·ders of 
the State> The sentence i$ not so explicit. I would 
not wish to den.v that one interpretation is the one 
you put on it; indeed, the implication in .tliat .sense 
is strong • . Bllt I do not accept that it amounts to 
conclusive evidence. 
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